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NATO Enlargement

  • Mark Webber
  • James Sperling
  • Martin A. Smith
Chapter
Part of the New Security Challenges Series book series (NSECH)

Abstract

NATO’s seemingly unassailable position at the Cold War’s end combined with a widespread recognition of American military supremacy produced in the former communist states of east-central Europe a simple vision of Europe’s evolving geostrategic environment and the functions of the Alliance. But once the initial euphoria that greeted the end of the Cold War had subsided, the difficult problem of integrating the former member states of the Warsaw Pact into a pan-European security order soon presented itself. Partnership for Peace (PfP) was the first step towards that integrative process, but many PfP participants also desired full NATO membership. Moreover, many NATO members, particularly Germany and the US, believed that Article 10 of the Washington Treaty compelled the Alliance to accept as members any European state that met the minimum criteria of institutionalized domestic democratic governance and the ability to contribute to the common defence consistent with the Treaty’s Article 5 obligation. Individual NATO states also had historical reasons for supporting the rapid accession of some states into the Alliance (Germany’s advocacy on behalf of Poland), a geostrategic interest in expanding the frontier of NATO beyond their own national border (Greece with respect to the Balkans and Turkey with respect to the Black Sea), a geopolitical interest in bolstering intra-Alliance leverage via sponsorship of specific states (France’s support of Romania) and courting domestic ethnic groups for electoral or pecuniary advantage (particularly prevalent in the US). These idiosyncratic rationales for supporting the membership of individual states do not, however, capture the broader forces driving the desire to seek membership or the willingness to extend it, on either a national or institutional basis.

Keywords

Accession State Baltic State Security Agenda Territorial Integrity European Security 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© Mark Webber, James Sperling and Martin A. Smith 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Webber
    • 1
  • James Sperling
    • 2
  • Martin A. Smith
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Government and SocietyUniversity of BirminghamUK
  2. 2.University of AkronUSA
  3. 3.Defence and International AffairsRoyal Military AcademySandhurstUK

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