Union without Consensus

Abstract

It has been pertinently observed that theories of integration should comprehend the possibility of disintegration, just as a process of enlargement should also include the possibility of contraction (Schmitter 2004:71). Yet in the case of European Union (EU) integration and enlargement, the prevailing teleological presumption of progress towards an ‘ever closer union’, albeit with spurts and pauses, has precluded serious consideration of either disunion or contraction. Consequently, a predominant conceptual inclination has resulted analytically in a systematic distortion of a complex process. While there have been occasional allusions in passing to the fact that confederal unions of states have historically led either to federal unity or disintegration, its implications for the EU have not been appreciated. Yet the hybrid EU has incorporated both surviving constituents of its initial federalising impetus as well as subsequent divergences of a more interstate nature, as member governments have increasingly asserted their particular interests, according priority to what divides rather than what unites. Lacking a shared enemy or purpose, the EU’s institutions have increasing difficulty in sharing authority between its member states.