Abstract
The theoretical core of this book has been to identify natural kinds as those categories which are indispensable for successful science in some specified domain. I have formulated this as two distinct requirements: the success clause requires that the category support successful science, and the restriction clause requires that it be indispensable. The latter allows us to distinguish the real features of the world from the categories which are introduced merely for scientific bookkeeping; that is, it separates the natural kinds from the merely conventional or fungible kinds. The overall account recognizes natural kinds as categories that support induction and scientific enquiry, categories which arise in and are genuine features of specific domains of objects and phenomena. Scientists themselves are typically only concerned with the first aspect of natural kinds: success. After all, their goal is to do science — not to do metaphysics. (I articulated the core account in Chapter 2, on the basis of desiderata discussed in Chapter 1.)
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsAuthor information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2012 P. D. Magnus
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Magnus, P.D. (2012). Conclusion. In: Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271259_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271259_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35035-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-27125-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)