Abstract
Theories that belong in the just war tradition propose sets of conditions under which a state engaging in war is morally justified in doing so. Opposed to the theory is pacifism: the view that war is always morally wrong. There are two ways to get from just war theory to pacifism. One is to take as fundamentally correct the view that war is morally wrong and, therefore, unjustifiable. So even if the conditions of just war theory are satisfied, it remains morally wrong for a state to fight a war. Attempting to add or amend the conditions of the theory is a futile exercise because there cannot be a set of conditions to justify what is considered to be morally unjustifiable. The problem with this approach to pacifism is that the view that war is always wrong is certainly not an obvious one that can be accepted without argument. It is based on the idea that any form of violence is morally unacceptable, including violence used to defend one’s life or the lives of those that one loves. On the face of it, this is rather implausible. In the context of the ethics of war, the question arises of what, for instance, a pacifist in Britain would do to stop Hitler from invading Britain and spreading the evils of Nazism, such as death camps. The idea that war is impermissible when nothing else works strikes many as unrealistic or plain wrong. In fact, it is said that Hitler was encouraged by the attempts at appeasement by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and by the meekness of the Jews he targeted.
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Notes
David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
The Principle of Discrimination requires that there be some way to decide who counts as a noncombatant, and different proposals have been presented about how this can be done in a way that supports the moral distinction between combatants and noncombatants. I use here the “chain of agency” criterion from Jeffrie Murphy, “The Killing of the Innocent” in War, Morality, and the Military Profession, ed. Malham M. Wakin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979) p. 346.
The meaning of innocence in war as it applies to noncombatants has been usefully discussed by Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 123–44.
G. E. M. Anscombe, “War and Murder” in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 51–61.
I do not take on the task of evaluating Truman’s decision. Though the fact that the atomic bombing was carried out as a terror bombing is not in dispute, historians disagree about the reasons for Truman’s decision and many Americans think that it is justified by military necessity or utilitarian reasons. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 263–8, takes a critical view of the use of the atomic bomb on Japan.
Jonathan Bennett, “Morality and Consequences” in the 1980 Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981), pp. 45–116, points out that a terror bomber needs only to intend that the civilians seem dead in order to achieve his goal of demoralizing the enemy, so their actual deaths are unintended side-effects of the actions needed to make them seem dead.
Kateri Carmola, “The Concept of Proportionality: Old Questions and New Ambiguities” in Just War Theory: A Reappraisal, ed. Mark Evans (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 96, traces the idea of proportionality all the way back to Aristotle’s account of justice.
This statement of in bello proportionality and the previous statement of ad bellum proportionality follow those in Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005), pp. 35–6. Hurka points out that his in bello principle is reflected in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention.
This version is used by Paul Ramsey in War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 379.
For critical discussion, see Jeff McMahan, “On the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (2006), pp. 377–93.
Michael Ignatieff, “Annals of Diplomacy: Balkan Physics,” New Yorker (May 10, 1999), p. 79. In fact, there were incidents where they mistook civilians for Serbian troops.
Gary D. Brown, “Proportionality and Just War,” Journal of Military Ethics 2 (2003), p. 181, criticizes James Turner Johnson for an incorrect reading of proportionality and asserts that “a weak formation of enemy troops is not protected from a stronger enemy force merely because of its impotence.”
This is the view of traditionalists such as James Turner Johnson in The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 36–7, who views the principles of last resort, proportionality and likelihood of success as prudential criteria of jus ad bellum to be distinguished from the traditional deontological criteria provided by the principles of legitimate authority, just cause and right intention (and the aim of peace) that were in Augustine’s just war theory.
John Howard Yoder, “When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking” in The Morality of War, ed. Larry May, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), p. 158.
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© 2012 David K. Chan
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Chan, D.K. (2012). Just War Reconsidered. In: Beyond Just War. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137263414_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137263414_3
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