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Evaluation of Fraser’s and Honneth’s Normative Approaches

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Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice
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Abstract

The normative approaches presented so far enable us to consider the relevance of justice and recognition as two powerful perspectives that must be included in social justice. We have seen that both Fraser and Honneth include in their theories the dimensions of justice and recognition as means to explain and ensure equal rights, equal citizenship, distribution of means and resources, and the recognition of different abilities and capacities. The fact that the claims for justice and recognition can be adequately answered by their normative perspectives turns their theories into first-rate actors when it comes to explaining the logic of the social struggles in contemporary societies. In addition, Fraser and Honneth give us something more than an attempt to harmonize the perspectives of recognition and justice under an egalitarian ideal; their approaches, as they explicitly say, can converge and contribute to the development of a critical theory of justice.1 I will return to this later, but so far, suffice it to say that a critical theory of justice must postulate a critical point of view that meets two requirements: the first is to be embodied in social processes in such a way that this point of view explains the emergence of claims for justice, and the second is to be capable of identifying the feasible social transformation necessary to ensure that which equal dignity requires.

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Notes

  1. See N. Fraser (2003), ‘Distorted beyond All Recognition: A Rejoinder to Axel Honneth’, in Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, pp. 150, 198–236;

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  2. A. Honneth (2003), ‘The Point of Recognition: A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder’, in Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, pp. 181, 237–267.

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  3. This idea of normative potential is adequately illustrated by Ernst Bloch’s interpretation of the idea of dignity inherent to natural law and its projection. See E. Bloch (1987), Natural Law and Human Dignity, translated by D.J. Schmidt (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

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  4. This interpretation of equal dignity was originally introduced by Charles Taylor. See C. Taylor (1994), ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ, and Chichester: Princeton University Press), pp. 25–73.

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  5. See a clear presentation of the concept of informational bases in A. Sen (1992), Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 73–74.

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  6. This concept structures the debate, known as ‘equality of what?’, that concentrates the most intensive and fruitful discussion on distributive justice. See R. Dworkin (2000), ‘What Is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources’, in Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press), pp. 65–119;

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  9. J. Rawls (1982), ‘Social Unity and Primary Goods’, in A. Sen and B.Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press/ Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme) pp. 159–185;

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  13. This interpretation coincides with relational views of equality. See E. Anderson (1999), ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics, 109 (2), 287–337; (2004), ‘Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependant-Care’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21 (3), 243–256;

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  15. See I. Robeyns (2003), ‘Is Nancy Fraser’s Critique of Theories of Distributive Justice Justified?’, Constellations, 10 (4), 538–553.

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  16. Young accurately criticizes the simplification of Fraser’s approach. See I. M. Young (2008), ‘Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser’s Dual Systems Theory’, in K. Olson (ed.), Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser Debates Her Critics (London: Verso), pp. 89–111, 94.

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  17. See R. Forst (2007), ‘First Things First: Redistribution, Recognition and Justification’, European Journal of Political Theory, 6 (3), 291–304.

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  18. See R. Dworkin (1978), Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), chapter 6; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §77.

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  19. Forst presents such a basic right as a right to justification. R. Forst (2011), The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 21.

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  20. J. Rawls (1993), Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 28.

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  21. See R. Forst (2002), Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 282.

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  22. See N. Kompridis (2004), ‘From Reason to Self-Realization? Axel Honneth and the “Ethical Turn” in Critical Theory’, in J. Rundell, D. Petherbridge, J. Bryant, J. Hewitt and J. Smith (eds), Contemporary Perspectives in Critical and Social Philosophy (Boston: Brill) pp. 323–360, 334–336.

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  23. See A. Honneth (2010), ‘Reconocimiento y criterios normativos’, interview by Gustavo Pereira, Andamios, 7 (13), 323–334.

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© 2013 Gustavo Pereira

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Pereira, G. (2013). Evaluation of Fraser’s and Honneth’s Normative Approaches. In: Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137263384_3

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