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The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO and the Use of Force

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Abstract

Germany’s behaviour in the run-up of NATO’s 2011 Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya came as a surprise to many allies since Germany did not participate in a military operation which fulfilled the criteria of a right cause (a ‘responsibility to protect’) and proper authority (a UN Security Council mandate), and which was supported by its most important European allies, France and Germany. Consequently, Germany was accused by the international media of moving away from ‘European unity’ while German commentators explained this decision with the country’s pacifist preference, immaturity in foreign and security policy and a preoccupation with domestic politics (Erlanger and Dempsey, 2011). German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also pointed to his country’s ‘tradition of [military] restraint’ as an explanation for Germany’s abstention (Der Spiegel, 2011).

Keywords

  • Security Policy
  • Military Force
  • German Government
  • Military Power
  • Defence Policy

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© 2013 B. Schreer

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Schreer, B. (2013). The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO and the Use of Force. In: Matlary, J.H., Petersson, M. (eds) NATO’s European Allies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137035004_9

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