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Abstract

It is characteristic of business ethics pedagogy (but not only business ethics) that it frequently uses specific and concrete ethics cases for which there are plausible competing responses. These ‘difficult ethical cases,’ as I so inventively call them, resist neat and easy solutions. All too often the more one knows or is told about them the more intractable they seem. In my experience these cases sometimes cause considerable distress for students, who, when asked to analyze or discuss the problems the case presents, exhibit responses ranging from helplessness and despair (‘What can we do when the “experts” disagree?’) to restlessness and irritation (Let’s forget all this philosophical nonsense and get on with it’).

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© 2013 Robert E. Frederick

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Frederick, R.E. (2013). Cases and Emotions. In: Hardy, G.M., Everett, D.L. (eds) Shaping the Future of Business Education. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137033383_17

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