Nigeria, “Democrazy,” and the German Political Foundations

Resumen

Most studies on the transfer of public policies to developing countries focus on the acceptance, the assimilation, or the refusal of norms. As a result, researchers usually analyze the factors of “cultural” resistance or “political” opposition to Western models of good governance (Brownlee, 2007; Bayart, 1996; Carothers, 2004.). But they often tend to insist on the importers’ failures rather than the exporters’ views to explain the rejection of the “democratic transplant.”1 So there is definitely a need to bridge academic gaps between three main categories of actors: the local ruling class, middlemen, and “translators,” and the international organizations that aim to promote political norms on a global scale. Africa’s most populated state, Nigeria, is an interesting case study in this regard, because it is both a typical example of bad governance and a testing ground for “democracy brokers.”2 Renowned for its corruption, its violence, and its “oil curse,” it has been monitored quite closely by the international community since the end of military rule and the return of civilian power in 1999. Compared to other countries in Africa, however, it seems to be less inf luenced by democracy brokers. A demographic and economic giant, Nigeria depends very little on international aid. Moreover, its ruling class is quite suspicious of foreign and humanitarian agencies that violated its national sovereignty during the Biafra War. A true regional power, Nigeria has also the capacity to reject Western models of governance despite poor management and the poverty of its population.

Nigerians live in the stone age. They are not ready for democracy. Their case is hopeless.

An international democracy maker in Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria.