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Belief State Intensity

  • Dale Jacquette

Abstract

Propositional belief state intensity is equivalently spoken of colloquially but no less phenomenologically as the strength of a believer’s belief. Belief state intensity is experienced first-hand when we know ourselves to accept a proposition’s truth with greater or lesser sense of importance or urgency and priority or precedence than in the case of other beliefs.1

Keywords

Practical Reasoning Semantic Content Belief State Epistemic Justification Lottery Ticket 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Dale Jacquette 2013

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  • Dale Jacquette

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