Justification

Abstract

In the first chapter, I suggested that one distinctively knowledge first thesis is the idea that, in an important sense, justification is a subsidiary of knowledge, and I noted that there are at least four distinct proposals to be considered here.¹ First, we have Williamson’s influential suggestion that one’s total evidence just is one’s knowledge, and that it is knowledge that justifies belief. According to the second approach, to have a justified belief that P just is to know that P. This view was originally formulated and defended by Sutton (2005; 2007), and although his arguments have not been well received, the view has recently begun picking up supporters, including Williamson (2007: 182; 2009: 359; 2011: 214–5; 2014: 5), Haddock (2010: 198–217), Ball (2013: 70–1) and Littlejohn (2013b). Third, Bird (2007) has proposed that justification is a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge, in a sense to be explained shortly.² Fourth, Reynolds has proposed that justification is the appearance of knowledge. Williamson’s equation of one’s evidence with one’s knowledge deserves close scrutiny, and it receives it in the next chapter. In this chapter, I’ll focus on the other three knowledge first approaches to justification.