Abstract
Salvific exclusivists believe that there are necessary conditions that must be met before salvation can be attained. Different salvific exclusivists believe in different necessary conditions. Common necessary conditions include: belief in the cardinal tenets of a particular religion, membership of a particular religious organization, conduct of particular religious practices and the avoidance of other practices. Salvific exclusivism stands in contrast with salvific pluralism. Salvific pluralists such as Himma (2002) hold that there is no set of conditions necessary for salvation. On this view, members of many religions are eligible for salvation, and their actual salvation depends on God’s consideration of their individual merits. A middle position between these two extremes is one that might be referred to as ‘salvific preferentialism’. This is the view that, although God favours those who hold certain religious beliefs, conduct certain religious practices, or are members of particular religious organizations; when deciding whom to grant salvation to, God does not apply hard and fast rules, and will consider the individual merits of those who lack the beliefs, practices and/or organizational membership required for preferential consideration.
Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface: ‘What do these people mean by crying out continually: “We may believe or not believe just as we choose.” Whom did Christ compel? They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught him.’
— Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2nd part of the 2nd part, Question 10, Article 8
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Adraoui, M.-A. (2008) ‘Purist Salafism in France’, ISIM Review 21: 12–13.
Anderson, S. (2006) ‘Coercion’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; available online at www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/coercion/ (accessed 3 February 2011).
Aquinas, T., Summa Theologiae, English trans. (1265–74); available online at www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html (accessed 3 February 2011).
Avalos, H. (2005) Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence (Amherst: Prometheus Books).
Clarke, S. (2009) ‘New Technologies, Common Sense and the Paradoxical Precautionary Principle’, in P. Sollie and M. Duwell (eds), Evaluating New Technologies: Methodological Problems for the Ethical Assessment of Technology Developments (Dordrecht: Springer), pp. 159–73.
Clarke, S. (2010) ‘Cognitive Bias and the Precautionary Principle: What’s Wrong with the Core Argument in Sunstein’s Laws of Fear and a Way to Fix It’, Journal of Risk Research 13: 163–74.
Duncan, C. (2007) ‘The Persecutor’s Wager’, Philosophical Review 116.1: 1–50.
Garcia, J. L. A., and M. T. Nelson (1994) ‘The Problem of Endless Joy: Is Infinite Utility Too Much for Utilitarianism?’, Utilitas 6: 183–92.
Gigerenzer, G. (2004) ‘Dread Risk, September 11 and Fatal Traffic Accidents’, Psychological Science 15: 286–7.
Himma, K. (2002) ‘Finding a High Road: The Moral Case for Salvific Pluralism’, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 52: 1–33.
Ignatieff, M. (2004) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
Jones, E. M. (1967) The Church-God’s Plan for Man: The Teaching of the Second Vatican Council (London: Burn and Oates).
Krop, H. A. (1989) ‘Duns Scotus and the Jews: Scholastic Theology and Enforced Conversion in the Thirteenth Century’, Nederlands Archiefvoor Kerkgeschiedenis 69: 161–75.
Lewis, D. (1989) ‘Mill and Milquetoast’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67.2: 152–71.
Locke, J. (1991) ‘A Letter concerning Toleration’, in J. Horton and S. Mendus (eds), John Locke: A Letter concerning Toleration in Focus (London: Routledge), pp. 12–56.
Manson, N. A. (2002) ‘Formulating the Precautionary Principle’, Environmental Ethics 24: 263–74.
Mill, J. S. (1859) On Liberty (London: J. W. Parker and Son).
Sandin, P. (2007) ‘Common Sense Precaution and Varieties of the Precautionary Principle’, in Tim Lewens (ed.), Risk: Philosophical Perspectives (London: Routledge), pp. 99–112.
Schmidtz, D. (2001) ‘A Place for Cost-Benefit Analysis’, Philosophical Issues (A Supplement to Nous) 11: 148–71.
Spector, H. (2008) Autonomy and Rights: The Moral Foundations of Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Sunstein, C. R. (2005) Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Turner, N. L. (2006) ‘Jewish Witness, Forced Conversion, and Island Living: John Duns Scotus on Jews and Judaism’, in Michael Frassetto (ed.), Christian Attitudes toward the Jews in the Middle Ages: A Casebook (London: Routledge), pp. 183–209.
Vallentyne, P., and S. Kagan (1997) ‘Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory’, The Journal of Philosophy 94.1: 5–26.
Waldron, J. (1991) ‘Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution’, in J. Horton and S. Mendus (eds), John Locke: A Letter concerning Toleration in Focus (London: Routledge), pp. 98–124.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2012 Steve Clarke
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Clarke, S. (2012). Coercion, Consequence and Salvation. In: Nagasawa, Y. (eds) Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026019_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026019_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-33187-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-02601-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)