Introduction

Abstract

There is a large consensus in the literature that logical analysis is at the core of Bertrand Russell’s thought.¹ The idea that doing philosophy is analysing knowledge remains a constant throughout the whole of Russell’s career and plays a prominent role in the period which goes from the publication of The Principles of Mathematics (PoM) (1903) to the publication of the last part of Principia Mathematica (PM) (1913). Disagreements occur, however, when one gets to the stage of explaining what Russell’s view of analysis was, and how it evolves. Thus, scholars disagree on the nature of certain particular analyses — for instance, on the interpretation of Russell’s 1903 theory of denotation and proposition,² on the meaning of his 1905 doctrine of definite description³ and on the reasons which led him to abandon his multiple relation theory of judgement in 1913.⁴ They also disagree on how to answer certain general questions like: What are the common features of Russell’s different analyses?⁵ What is the ontological import of an analysis?⁶ How is the relation between understanding and analysing a concept or a proposition to be conceived?⁷ There is no doubt that the decomposition of complex terms in PoM, the analysis of definite descriptions and the late theory of judgement in PM are important examples of analyses. There is also no doubt that the questions concerning the unity of the analytic method, its ontological import and its epistemological significance are philosophically central.

‘These are some of the rules of classification and definition. But although nothing is more important in science than classifying and defining well, we need say no more about it here, because it depends much more on our knowledge of the subject matter being discussed than on the rules of logic.’

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La logique ou l’art de penser (II, xvi, 1683)