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On the Validity of Laboratory Research in the Political and Social Sciences: The Example of Crime and Punishment

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Experimental Political Science

Part of the book series: Research Methods Series ((REMES))

Abstract

Policies against crime often focus on more extensive crime control schemes and more severe punishments (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 2001). Examples are the ‘zero tolerance’ policy or the program ‘three strikes and you’re out’ (Cohen, 1985; Dreher and Feltes, 1997; Austin et al., 1999; Zimring, 2001; Hudson, 2002).

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Authors
  1. Heiko Rauhut
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  2. Fabian Winter
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, Austria

    Bernhard Kittel (Professor of Economic Sociology) (Professor of Economic Sociology)

  2. Ruhr University Bochum, Germany

    Wolfgang J. Luhan (Assistant Professor) (Assistant Professor)

  3. New York University, USA

    Rebecca B. Morton (Professor of Politics) (Professor of Politics)

Copyright information

© 2012 Heiko Rauhut and Fabian Winter

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Rauhut, H., Winter, F. (2012). On the Validity of Laboratory Research in the Political and Social Sciences: The Example of Crime and Punishment. In: Kittel, B., Luhan, W.J., Morton, R.B. (eds) Experimental Political Science. Research Methods Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016645_10

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