Introduction

Abstract

Epistemic coherentism has not merited much attention throughout the history of philosophy. Two explanations for this neglect stand out. First, when a statement is challenged one defends it by citing another statement. This aspect of how to respond to challenges in specific contexts leads to the thought that the structure of epistemic justification corresponds to the structure of responding to challenges in a specific context. Socrates’ persistent search for particular reasons or Descartes’ method of doubt manifests this natural tendency. Both search for reason’s proper ground in some unchallengeable propositions whose epistemic merits is independent of any particular perspective. It is natural to extend this pragmatic feature of the activity of justifying belief to the state of being justified in one’s beliefs. This natural search for reason’s proper grounding obscures the plausibility of epistemic coherentism.

A coherent Thinker, and a strict Reasoner, is not to be made at once by a Set of Rules.

I. Watts Logick 1725

Be plain and coherent.

Dickens Dombey and Son 1848

It is reason’s proper work to provide us with a maximum of explanatory coherence and comprehensiveness

Sosa Knowledge in Perspective 1991