Abstract
In the third paragraph of his essay ‘Der Gedanke’, Frege delivers a criticism of the correspondence theory of truth in altogether three consecutive arguments, culminating in the conclusion that the ‘attempt to explain truth as a correspondence’ fails. Subsequently he provides one more brief argument to show that ‘any other attempt to define truth’ is doomed to fail as well. Frege here thinks of truth as an absolute concept rather than a relational one; that is, a true thought is supposed to be true in itself rather than being merely true for one or the other person X, true in a language Y, or true of an object or state of affairs Z.
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© 2012 Ulrich Pardey
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Pardey, U. (2012). Introduction: In Tarski’s Shadow. In: Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012234_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012234_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-43653-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-01223-4
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