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Outsourcing Public Services: Process Innovation in Dutch Municipalities

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Organizational Innovation in Public Services

Part of the book series: Governance and Public Management ((GPM))

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Abstract

Outsourcing by a government agency can loosely be defined as a contractual relation of the agency with an external vendor, in which the vendor provides activities that are part of the overall business process of the agency. If one takes a close look at the phenomena indicated by ‘outsourcing’, myriad variations come into view.

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Authors
  1. Alex D. R. Corra
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  2. Jacobus de Ridder
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Management, University of Tampere, Finland

    Pekka Valkama (Research Director, Adjunct Professor), Stephen J. Bailey (Distinguished Professor and Emeritus Professor of Public Sector Economics) & Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko (Adjunct Professor) (Research Director, Adjunct Professor),  (Distinguished Professor and Emeritus Professor of Public Sector Economics) &  (Adjunct Professor)

  2. Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Finland

    Pekka Valkama (Research Director, Adjunct Professor) (Research Director, Adjunct Professor)

  3. Glasgow Caledonian University, UK

    Stephen J. Bailey (Distinguished Professor and Emeritus Professor of Public Sector Economics) (Distinguished Professor and Emeritus Professor of Public Sector Economics)

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© 2013 Alex D. R. Corra and Jacobus de Ridder

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Corra, A.D.R., de Ridder, J. (2013). Outsourcing Public Services: Process Innovation in Dutch Municipalities. In: Valkama, P., Bailey, S.J., Anttiroiko, AV. (eds) Organizational Innovation in Public Services. Governance and Public Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137011848_8

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