The “Other” Side of the Dialectic: Toward a Materialist Ethic of Care

Abstract

It is not just the “inadequate” demonstrations of rationality that is used against disabled subjects (especially those with severe and/or cognitive impairments) that prevents them from claiming the rights to full citizenship. It is also their perceived lack of autonomy on account of their dependence on their caregivers (paid and/or unpaid) for the social reproduction of their lives. In Chapter 5, I had briefly alluded to this dilemma through the critique offered by feminist philosopher Eva Feder Kittay, when she argued that her daughter’s continued dependence on her caregivers even into adulthood does not cast her unequivocally as an undue burden on society because of the popular perception that such relationships are often incapable of being reciprocal. On the other hand, Kittay argues that there is much in this relationship that is reciprocal that may not have much economic value, but most certainly has affective value.

To put it bluntly—because the need is blunt as it gets—we must have our asses cleaned after we shit and pee. Or we have others’ fingers inserted into our rectum to assist shitting. Or we have tubes of plastic inserted inside us to assist peeing or we have re-routed anuses and pissers so we do it all into bags attached to our bodies. These blunt, crude realities. Our daily lives … We rarely talk about these things … Because let’s face it: we have great shame about this need … If we are ever really home in the world and in ourselves, then we must say these things out loud. And we must say them with real language.

(Cheryl Marie Wade as quoted in Siebers, 2008, p. 65)