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Chaos and Reform in the Soviet Union and Russia

  • Robert Solomon

Abstract

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, he was presiding over a large economy, rich in resources but also inefficient and isolated from the world economy. In the 1960s the USSR produced Sputnik and Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet economy would ‘bury’ the west. In the 1970s the Soviet Union had to import large amounts of grain. In the 1980s its growth rate slowed and dissatisfaction with its economic performance began to be openly expressed. The inadequacies of central planning described in the previous chapter applied, of course, to the Soviet Union, from which central planning was exported to Eastern Europe.

Keywords

Central Bank Total Factor Productivity World Economy Economic Reform Communist Party 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Robert Solomon 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Solomon

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