Abstract
Liddell Hart’s reputation as one who decisively influenced the proponents of armoured warfare in Germany during the interwar period has recently been marred and thrown into question. It has been revealed that this reputation was largely self-propagated, and that to create it he actually exploited the plight in which the German generals were after the Second World War, unscrupulously manipulating their evidence for his own ends.1 For several years after the war the German generals were detained as prisoners of war by the Allies, awaiting the decision on whether to put them on trial for war crimes. Liddell Hart made contact with a group of them who were held not far from his house in the Lake District. He interviewed them on their prewar and war experiences and soon developed further contacts with other senior German generals held in Germany. Their evidence served as the basis for his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948), or The German Generals Talk, as the American edition was called. Out of deepest conviction and best of motives, Liddell Hart became one of the leaders of an unpopular public campaign on the German generals’ behalf.He argued relentlessly that they were no more than honourable and patriotic professional soldiers who had generally kept aloof from politics, had had an instinctive class and caste dislike for the Nazi regime, and had not been involved in Nazi atrocities.
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Notes
Kenneth Macksey in ‘Liddell Hart: the Captain Who Taught Generals’, The Listener, 28 Dec. 1972, 895; idem, Guderian: Panzer General (London, 1975), 40–1; idem, The Tank Pioneers, 118, 216; elaborated and expanded by Mearsheimer, LH, 160–7, 184–201.
Manstein files 9/24/71 and 9/24/124; Paget to LH 12 Apr. 1951, LH to Paget 1 May 1951, in 1/563; Reginald Paget, Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trials (London, 1951), 22; LH, Memoirs, ii. 203–4; Mearsheimer, LH, 188–9; Bond, LH, 232–3.
Walter Nehring’s useful Die Geschichte der deutschen Panzerwaffe, 1916 his 1945 (Berlin, 1969), was also written by a veteran of the Panzer arm and Guderian’s subordinate.
James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, Kans., 1992).
Heeresdienstvorschrift 487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, (Berlin, 1923), esp. paragraphs 347, 362, 523–37, 551. Similarly see in the guidelines for an exercise prepared by the Inspekteur der Verkehrstruppen (In. 6[K]), 1 July 1924, in RH 39/115 (henceforth all German documentary references are to the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg im Breisgau). See also Corum, Seeckt and German Military Reform, 122–6.
Ernst Volckheim, Die deutschen Kampfwagen im Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1923); idem, Der Kampfwagen in der heutigen Kriegsführung (Berlin, 1924); idem, in Militär-Wochenblatt, 25 July 1924, 718; 4 Aug. 1924, 119–22; 11 Oct. 1925, 465–8, and 18 April 1926, 1409–12. He was also the chief writer in six special supplementary issues to the journal, entitled Der Kampfwagen (The Tank’) and published monthly between Oct. 1924 and March 1925. An example of his work from August 1924 on tank instruction in the army can be found in RH 12–2/51. See also Corum, Seeckt and German Military Reform, 126–30.
Fritz Heigl, Taschenbuch der Tanks (Munich, 1926); expanded posthumous edns 1935, 1938; Heigl’s contributions to Militär-Wochenblatt can be found in nearly every other issue. See also Corum, Seeckt and German Military Reform, 103.
For the Heavy and Light Tractors see Walter Spielberger, Die Motorisierung der deutschen Reichswehr 1920–1935 (Stuttgart, 1979), 281–350;
Werner Oswald, Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr (Stuttgart, 1982), 340–6; Corum, Seeckt and German Military Reform, 112–18. On the cooperation with the Soviet Union see
Manfred Zeidler, Reichswehr und Rote Armee 1920–1933 (Munich, 1993), 188–98.
Volckheim, Betrachtungen über Kampfwagen-Organisation und Verwendung. Zu einer Abhandlung des englischen Majors Sherbrooke (Berlin, 1924), 1; idem, Kampfwagen und Abwehr dagegen (Berlin, 1925), 3, 9–10; both booklets reprinted from Wissen und Wehr; Heigl, Taschenbuch der Tanks, 78, 322–6.
Cited by Michael Geyer, ‘German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986), 559; Geyer, too, emphasizes the British influence in these years on the genesis of the Panzer arm.
Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, 17–18, 87. The American copying of the British manoeuvres (and the influence of Fuller and Liddell Hart) is revealed on the basis of the documents by John Hendrix, ‘The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Approach’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 16 (1993), 77–81. As in Britain, General Douglas MacArthur, chief of staff of the US Army, finally decided to disband the experimental armoured force, and in the mid-1930s he opted for the mechanization of the whole army. In any case, LH did not exaggerate when he pointed out that MacArthur’s 1935 Annual Report, emphasizing the coming of a mechanized battlefield, was unmistakably littered with LH’s distinctive ideas and concepts: The Times, 22 Nov. 1935; LH, The Tanks, i. 271–2; Memoirs, i. 354–5.
See the official history, based on the documents: Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami, La Meccanizzazione dell’esercito italiano dalle origini al 1943 (Rome, 1989), 113–32.
Erickson, The Soviet High Command (London, 1962), 263–70; Simpkin, Deep Battle, 38 and passim; Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, 114–21.
For obvious reasons, too, LH wrote misleadingly in his Memoirs, i. 171–2, that they had discussed Sherman; cf. his records at the time: 7 and 8 Mar. 1932, in 11/1932/1 and 11/1932/9; this has been pointed out by Mearsheimer, LH, 162–3. See also Robert M. Citino, The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics: Germany Defends Itself against Poland 1918–1933 (London, 1987).
Major Guderian, ‘Bewegliche Truppenkörper. Eine kriegsgeschichtliche Studie’, Militär-Wochenblatt, 11, 18, 25 Nov., 4, 11, Dec. 1927, 649–53, 687–94, 728–31, 772–6, 819–22.
See also Bradley, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian und die Entstehungsgeschichte des modernen Blitzkrieges (Osnabruck, 1978), 166.
Sharp criticism of Guderian’s egocentrism is expressed by Corum, Seeckt and German Military Reform, esp. 137–9; Corum, however, overstates a good case not only by unconvincingly claiming for Seeckt the crown of military innovation but also by blurring the difference between the Reichswehr’s early attention to tanks which went along conventional lines and the new ideas developed from the mid-1920s under British influence. Guderian’s cursory references to Volckheim and Heigl in Panzer Leader, 20–1, is in this respect understandable. On this see the balanced judgement of S.J. Lewis, Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy 1918–1941 (New York, 1985), 18.
Michael Geyer, ‘Das zweite Rustungsprogramm (1930–1934)’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 17 (1975), 25–72; Deist in MF (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, i. 395–9.
Major Nehring, Kampfwagen an die Front! Geschichte und neuzeitliche Entwicklung des Kampfwagens (‘Tanks’) im Auslande (Leipzig, 1934), 20–1; there is no need to dwell on the difficulty of translating the German operativ, standing in an intermediate position between the English ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ and signifying combat strategy in the theatre of operations.
‘England. Die Manöver der Kampfwagentruppen, Sommer 1932’, 32 pp., 16 May 1933, copies in RH 2/2968 and RHD 18/137; noted by W. Heinemann, ‘The Development of German Armoured Forces 1918–1940’, in Harris and Toase (eds), Armoured Warfare, 53. Much of the material for the years 1932–34, contained in RH 2 and RH 12, is reportedly missing; but see the file by T3, ‘Motorization and Mechanization in Britain at the Beginning of 1931’, 15 pp. plus pictures, 10 Feb. and 20 March 1931, RH 12–6/v. 22; The Daily Telegraph is among the sources cited; there are similar surveys of Poland, France and Czechoslovakia.
His memoirs, Freiherr Geyer von Schweppenburg, Erinnerungen eines Militärattachés, London 1933–1937 (Stuttgart, 1949), focus mainly on the political-strategic aspect of his mission.
See e.g. Eimannsberger, Der Kampfwagen Krieg, 110; G.P. von Zezschwitz, Heigls Taschenbuch der Tanks, iii (Berlin, 1938), passim.; Nehring, Kampfwagen an die Front!, 20, all identifying the British school with Fuller who is the sole authority they cite. In Nehring, Heere von Morgen. Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Heeresmotorisierung des Auslandes (3rd edn.; Potsdam, 1935), 9, 28–9, Liddell Hart is presented as Fuller’s partner; the conclusion is: ‘The actual impact of the inspired enlightening work of these two British officers can be seen in the series of instructive exercises conducted by the British high command in the last four years, which may offer a valuable clue for the armament of a modern army.’
Cited from the British cabinet papers by Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, ‘The British Armed Forces’, in A.R. Millett and W. Murray, Military Effectiveness (London, 1988), ii. 112.
Erich von Manstein, Aus einem Soldatenleben 1887–1939 (Bonn, 1958), 128–9, 240–3.
Hubertus Senff, Die Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe im deutschen Heer zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Frankfurt a. M., 1969), 23–6; Nicholas Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff, 103–5; Deist in MF (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, i. 431–6;
Klaus-Jürgen Müller, General Ludwig Beck, Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938 (Boppard, 1980), esp. 208–19; idem, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany 1933–45 (Manchester, 1987), 54–99; Lewis, Forgotten Legions, xiii-xiv, 51–3.
Kommando der Panzertruppen, ‘Erfahrungsbericht über die Versuchsübungen einer Panzerdivision auf dem Truppenübungsplatz Münster im August 1935’, 24 Dec. 1935, RHD 26/2.
Guderian, ‘Schnelle Truppen einst und jetzt’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 4 (1939), 240–1. See also idem, Panzer Leader, 36; Manstein, Aus einem Soldatenlehen, 242.
See Abt II, 13 Aug. 1936, in RH 2/1135, and cf. Guderian, ‘Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit den anderen Waffen’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 1 (1936), 614–15 (citing Fuller, The Army in My Time); reissued separately in book form the following year.
Heigls, Taschenbuch der Tanks (2 vols; Munich, 1935), ii. 455–7.
M.J. Kurtzinski (ed. and tr.), Taktik Schneller Verbände (Potsdam, 1935).
‘Operative und taktische Grundsätze sowjetrussischer Kriegsführung’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 3 (1938), 557–74, 671–86. See also Max Werner, The Military Strength of the Powers (London, 1939), 106–16 and passim.
Guderian, ‘Kraftfahrkampftruppen’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 1 (1936), 73, citing Kryshanowski; also Achtung Panzer!, 151–4.
See esp. F.O. Miksche, Blitzkrieg (London, 1942);
Klaus Maier’s contribution to MF (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, ii (Oxford, 1991), 41–3.
Larry Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865–1941 (New Brunswick N.J., 1971), passim;
Michael Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit. Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980), 481; Carver, The Apostles of Mobility, 63–4;
Daniel J. Hughes, ‘Abuses of German Military History’, Military Review (Dec. 1986), 69–70; also, somewhat along these lines, Mearsheimer, LH, 87, 92. For the argument that ‘Blitzkrieg’ diverged from the traditional German emphasis on battles of annihilation see
Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933–1945 (London, 1978), 130–48 and passim; Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 38–9;
Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (London, 1984), 86, 206–7.
Michael Geyer’s hyperbolic claim that ‘Blitzkrieg’ was defined as an operational design only in hindsight and with some help from Liddell Hart is basically correct: Geyer, ‘German Strategy’, in Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, 585–6; also Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘The Political and Strategic Significance of Advances in Armament Technology: Developments in Germany and the “Strategy of Blitzkrieg”’, in R. Ahmann, A. M. Birke and M. Howard (eds), The Quest for Stability (Oxford, 1993), 249–61;
J. P. Harris, ‘The Myth of Blitzkrieg’, War in History, 2 (1995), 335–52, repeating, however, the erroneous claims about LH’s lack of influence.
For the debate on Hitler’s ‘economic Blitzkrieg’ see: A.S. Milward, The German Economy in War (London, 1965);
R.J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1994).
Robert O’Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party (London, 1966), 127.
Germains had anticipated this criticism in his The ‘Mechanization’ of War, 178. For North Africa see the opinions of Rommel and Bayerlein, The Rommel Papers, 159, 184. Michael Carver, Tobruk (London, 1964), esp. 254–5 lays much of the blame on LH’s teachings;
also Shelford Bidwell, Gunners at War (London, 1970), 163–82. In his reply to Carver LH cleverly threw the blame on the ‘cavalry mentality’ of many of the newly converted British armour commanders: The Times Literary Supplement, 19 Nov. 1964.
See e.g. Nehring, Heere von Morgen, Bibliography, 9, 33–5; idem, Panzerabwehr, 53; Guderian, ‘Kraftfahrkampftruppen’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 1 (1936), 71 ; idem, ‘Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit den anderen Waffen’, ibid., 616–17, 619; idem, Achtung Panzer!, 150, Bibliography.
Quoted in Trythall, Fuller, 209–10. For André Beaufre’s recollections of the effect of LH’s writings on the younger generation of French officers see Michael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War (London, 1965), 138–41; cf. Alexander, Gamelin, 242–3.
Ibid.; Guderian, ‘Kraftfahrkampftruppen’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 1 (1936), 68; idem, Achtung Panzer!, 143; the whole thing was rightly pointed out by Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, 43–4, 57–8, 79.
See W. Veiten, Das deutsche Reichsheer und die Grundlagen seiner Truppenführung (Munster, 1982); and the persistent emphasis in the training instructions issued by the Command of the Panzer Troops: RHD 26/2 (24 Dec. 1935), RHD 26/3 (10 Nov. 1935), RHD 26/4 (10 Nov. 1936), RHD 26/5 (15 Nov. 1937); also Guderian, Achtung Panzer!, 178ff and passim.
See e.g. Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope (London, 1960; foreword by LH), 79–80.
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© 2000 Azar Gat
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Gat, A. (2000). British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm. In: British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333982389_2
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