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Abstract

The previous chapter suggested that, in spite of several threats, the European Central Bank might be one of the most independent central banks in the world. Such an unprecedented degree of independence is considered by some, however, as a cause for concern unless it is accompanied by adequate accountability.

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© 2000 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi and Daniel Gros

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Smaghi, L.B., Gros, D. (2000). … and Accountable?. In: Open Issues in European Central Banking. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333981887_7

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