Abstract
The Suez Crisis fundamentally altered the political alignments of the Middle East. Throughout the Arab world the influence of the primary Western state, Great Britain, had ebbed to the point of non-existence, while the nationalist forces were emboldened and poised to assume control. As significant as the altered relationships may have been, they did not impact the objectives of the Eisenhower administration. The United States was still committed to mobilizing the Middle East for the task of containment by reducing Egyptian influence. However, the achievement of this goal required a more activist policy than previously pursued.
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Notes
Elie Podeh, ‘The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis’, Middle Eastern Studies (January 1993): 97.
Jeffrey Lafebvre, ‘The United States and Egypt: Confrontation and Accommodation in Northeast Africa, 1956–1960’, Middle Eastern Studies (April 1993): 329–31.
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© 2000 Ray Takeyh
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Takeyh, R. (2000). The Eisenhower Doctrine. In: The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333981788_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333981788_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-42067-4
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