Abstract
Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal led both Washington and London to question their approach to the Middle East conundrum. In the United States, Egypt’s act further diminished the hope of guiding Cairo in a direction conducive to the containment doctrine. Although Omega’s initial two stages had failed, the US still saw much value in the plan. By exerting economic and political pressure on Egypt, the Americans hoped to erode the standing of the uncooperative Egyptian regime and build the walls of containment through alternative centers of power. In this sense, the Eisenhower team continued to underestimate the ability of Egypt to condition the political climate of the Arab world.
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Notes
Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (New York, 1964), 308.
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© 2000 Ray Takeyh
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Takeyh, R. (2000). The Suez Crisis. In: The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333981788_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333981788_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-42067-4
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