Operation Omega and the Policy of Antagonism

Part of the St Antony’s Series book series


By March 1956, the United States began to view the direction of Egypt’s policy as hindering its objectives, and attempted to defuse the nationalist challenge. The new policy, code-named Omega, was based on existing assumptions as Washington continued to seek to impose its aims on Cairo. While in the past few years that goal would have been sought through selective cooperation, now it would be accomplished by a program of gradual coercion. Thus, either the Egyptian government would have to accept the administration’s aims or face increasing marginalization. Omega, however, failed to achieve its intended result since the Egyptian regime neither altered its policies nor saw a reduction of its influence. The Eisenhower administration simply failed to understand that just as Egyptian pan-Arabism was too powerful a force to be subsumed in the Cold War framework, so too it would prove too resilient to be reoriented or marginalized through punitive measures.


Saudi Arabia Middle East Arab World Arab State Western Power 
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Copyright information

© Ray Takeyh 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California at BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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