American Diplomacy and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty

Part of the St Antony’s Series book series


From June 1953 to July 1954, the primary aim of the United States was to resolve the Anglo-Egyptian base dispute. This was the first test of the administration’s policy of attempting to influence Egypt by accommodating certain objectives of the Free Officers. This episode also marks the American attempt to remodel British presence in the region and thus achieve a viable defense for the containment of the Soviet Union. Both of these goals required a quick resolution to the acrimonious conflict that was increasing neutralist trends in the Middle East and offering the Russians an opportunity for mischief and exploitation. The tortuous course of American diplomacy and the type of treaty that was finally produced are the subject of this chapter.


Prime Minister Middle East Arab World Military Leadership Conservative Party 
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Copyright information

© Ray Takeyh 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California at BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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