Two Failed Reforms, 1827–1828

Abstract

The military reforms of Nicholas’s reign that ended by creating the basic administrative structure of the modern Russian army began as a simple attempt to save money. Nicholas was acutely aware of Russia’s financial difficulties from the moment he took the throne, and the war that Persia began by invading Russia’s Caucasian provinces in 1826 focused his attention even more tightly on the problem. In that year he wrote to Constantine, “Without being in desperate straits, we are doing badly, and You can believe me in this; we have one war on our hands, it is still not costing very much, but no one can answer either for its duration or for the losses it may require of us as much 1) in men as in 2) money; the second object cannot be fulfilled by new taxes in a country like ours…. We must therefore economize, but from where is the question….”¹ Nicholas answered that question by attempting to economize on the administration. He made two attempts before the war with Turkey, and both failed. Like the failed efforts at codification of those years, however, these attempts at economizing through reform provided the impetus and context for later attempts that would succeed. Above all, they would teach Nicholas and his advisors that half-measures simply would not do and that Russia’s financial problems were linked to administrative problems that were not easily resolved.