Abstract
LATO: Wittgenstein was fond of quoting from old Augustine’s description of how he learned to speak—or at least how he imagined he learned to speak.1 He was especially interested in this because it contained two assumptions,2 which together became major objects of criticism in his own discussions—indeed they ramified the whole of his later philosophy.
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© 2007 H. A. Knott
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Knott, H.A. (2007). An Instinct for Meaning. In: Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230627604_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230627604_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35305-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-62760-4
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