Record and Interpretation: A Question of Paradigm

Abstract

For many years — especially during the more turbulent first and third periods of Occupation history, as identified in the introduction to this study — there have been two schools of thought concerning the wartime record of the Island administrations in their dealings with the enemy. The first more or less supports the view that they were mostly nest-feathering collaborators; the second, in full accord with the official British stance in 1945, that they did their best under difficult circumstances. An exploration of the developments affecting the post-War face of Island Government will follow in Chapter 15. But first, in view of the large number of criticisms which have been raised or reignited about their wartime conduct in recent years, the next two chapters will take a fresh look at the relationship between the Occupier and the Island officials in order to seek out a better understanding of the situation as it unfolded on the ground. The fact is that many accusations of collaboration with the enemy have occurred simply as a result of the wording of various Government announcements made in the Islands’ censored Press. Taken at face value, many do appear to have the interests of the enemy wholly in mind. Yet in recent years, a considerable amount of fresh evidence has become available, which clearly suggests that earlier judgements of collaborative intent are quite simply wrong and that, unknown to the public, all kinds of pressures were being exerted upon their officials behind the scenes.

With regard to the notice headed ‘Reward of 25,£ I and I alone am responsible for it, as at that time I was very much alarmed at the reaction of the Germans when they discovered that in spite of the first warning, more ‘V’ signs were being painted up all over the Island and even on gate posts of houses in which German officers and soldiers were billeted. I had a very stormy interview with the Feldcommandant at which all kinds of things were threatened and I was afraid that they would take hostages (of which I understand that they had a list of 80) and either shoot them or deport them to concentration camps in Germany or elsewhere. I thought therefore that a notice of this kind would be the only way to stop the matter, which it actually did for a few days … I have nothing further to say on the subject except that I believe the majority of the civilian population realised that though these notices bore my signature they were really German orders.

Victor Carey’s reply to questions, June 1945¹