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Competition for Power: Party Switching and Party System Change in Japan

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Abstract

The reasons that individual legislators change their party affiliations are as varied as the goals they hold dear. Primary among them are electoral, office, and policy considerations. The payoffs from party switching are closely linked to electoral and party systems, as well as the dynamics of party competition. In short, the institutional context defined by electoral rules and party politics influences party switching, which in turn can affect the dynamics of party competition; party switching by individual legislators thus has the potential to alter party systems.

Keywords

  • Decisive Majority
  • Formal Majority
  • Party System
  • Proportional Representation
  • Liberal Democratic Party

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© 2009 William B. Heller and Carol Mershon

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Kato, J., Yamamoto, K. (2009). Competition for Power: Party Switching and Party System Change in Japan. In: Heller, W.B., Mershon, C. (eds) Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230622555_9

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