Abstract
Organizations create projects to meet a variety of their business, technical, organizational, or political needs. During a project’s early phases, one of the more important tasks of the project team is to translate undefined needs into clear objectives and requirements. Typically, several successive sets of objectives are developed, with each set being more detailed than its predecessor. The first set mainly focuses on the business and functional objectives, while each of the more detailed sets translates the previous set of objectives into technical requirements.
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Notes
B.H. Boar. 1984. Application Prototyping. New York, NY: Wiley, 3.
A.M. Davis. 1995. 201 Principles of Software Development. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 48.
D.C. Gause and G.M. Weinberg. 1989. Exploring Requirements: Quality Before Design. New York, NY: Dorset House Publishing, 17.
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A. Laufer. 1989. Owner’s Project Planning: The Process Approach, Source Document 45. The Construction Industry Institute, the University of Texas at Austin.
D.N. Michael. 1997. Learning to Plan and Planning to Learn, 2nd ed. Alexandria, VA: Miles River Press, 128. See also P. J. H. Schoemaker. 2002. Profiting from Uncertainty, Appendix A: The Psychology of Uncertainty. New York, NY: The Free Press, 223–31. On the basis of research literature, Schoemaker concludes that “our myopic eyes tend to narrow our range of view, and so fail to appreciate the full scale of uncertainty … In addition to myopic and distorted perceptions about risk, humans also tend to have rather timid souls when acting upon risk (however they perceive it).”
G. Howell, A. Laufer, and G. Ballard. 1993. Uncertainty and Project Objectives. Project Appraisals, 1: 37–43.
J. G. March. 1976. The Technology of Foolishness. In Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, eds. J.G. March and J. P. Olsen, 69–81. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
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See M. Engwall. 2002. The Futile Dream of the Perfect Goal. In Beyond Project Management: New Perspectives on the Temporary—Permanent Dilemma, eds. K. Sahlin-Andersson and A. Söderholm, 241–60. Stockholm: Lund: Liber/Abstrakt, CBS-Press.
G. Stalk and T. M. Hout. 1990. Competing Against Time. New York, NY: The Free Press;
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C.B. Tatum, J.A. Vanegas, and J. M. Williams. 1986. Constructability Improvement during Conceptual Planning, Source Document 4. The Construction Industry Institute, the University of Texas at Austin;
C.B. Tatum, J.A. Vanegas, and J.M. Williams. 1987. Constructability Improvement Using Prefabrication, Preassembly, and Modularization, Source Document 25. The Construction Industry Institute, the University of Texas at Austin;
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See, for example, A. Laufer. 1996. Simultaneous Management: Managing Projects in a Dynamic Environment. New York, NY: AMACOM;
K. Bozdogan, J. Deyst, D. Hoult, and M. Lucas. 1998. Architectural Innovation in Product Development through Early Supplier Integration. R&D Management 28, 3: 163–73.
B.H. Boar. 1984. Application Prototyping. New York, NY: Wiley. The book makes a very effective case for the use of prototyping in data processing projects. B.W. Boehm, TE. Gray, and T. Seewaldt. 1984. Prototyping Versus Specifying: A Multiproject Experiment. IEEE Transaction on Software Engineering, SE-10, 3: 290–303. K.B. Clark and T. Fujimoto. 1991. Product Development Performance. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. See also M. Schrage. 2000. Serious Play: How the World’s Best Companies Simulate to Innovate. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
See H. Mintzberg, 1990. Strategy Formation: Schools of Thought. In Perspectives on Strategic Management, ed. J. Frederickson, 147–59. New York, NY: Harper Business.
See also H. Mintzberg. 1994. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners. New York, NY: The Free Press.
One attempt to address this issue can be found in Barry Boehm and Richard Turner. 2004. Balancing Agility and Discipline: A Guide for the Perplexed. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
R.L. Ackoff. 1970. A Concept of Corporate Planning. New York, NY: Wiley, 3.
K. Weick and K.M. Sutcliffe. 2001. Managing the Unexpected. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 51–83.
A. Laufer, R. L. Tucker, A. Shapira, and A. J. Shenhar. 1994. The Multiplicity Concept in Construction Planning. Construction Management and Economics 11: 53–65.
A. Laufer and R.L. Tucker. 1987. Is Construction Project Planning Really Doing Its Job? A Critical Examination of Focus, Role and Process. Construction Management and Economics 5, 3: 243–66. Ackoff provides a classic definition for control: “To plan is to make decisions. Control is the evaluation of decisions … once they have been implemented. The process of control involves four steps:
Predicting the outcome of decisions in the form of performance measures.
Collecting information on actual performance.
Comparing actual with predicted performance.
When a decision is shown to have been deficient, “correcting the procedure that produced it and correcting its consequences where possible.” R.L. Ackoff. 1970. A Concept of Corporate Planning. New York, NY: Wiley, 112.
The basic assumption in the classic project management literature is that “the core of project management is planning the project.” J. Packendorff. 1995. Inquiring into the Temporary Organization: New Directions for Project Management Research. Scandinavian Journal of Management 11, 4: 319–33. This was also the case outside projects, in management of the permanent organization. Herbert Simon stated, “What part does decision making play in managing? I shall find it convenient to take mild liberties with the English language by using ‘decision making’ as though it were synonymous with ‘managing.’” H.A. Simon. 1960. The New Science of Management Decision. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1. In the first issue of The Journal of the Academy of Management, Paul Dauten analyzes the relationship between planning and management and asserts that “one might say that the fundamental principle underlying all of management is planning.” P.M. Dauten Jr. 1958. Management Philosophy: The Time Dimensions of Planning. Journal of the Academy of Management 1, 1: 23–33.
CPM is a scheduling technique using precedence diagrams for graphic display of the work plan. This method is used to determine the length of a project and to identify activities that are critical to its completion.
A. Davies and M. Hobday. 2005. The Business of Projects: Managing Innovation in Complex Products and Systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 152.
R. Stout Jr. 1980. Management or Control?: The Organizational Challenge. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 25.
R. Stout Jr. 1980. Management or Control?: The Organizational Challenge. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 26.
In his comprehensive review of the development of project management, this is how Morris viewed this issue: “Writing in the area of planning and control seemed livelier, but largely only because of the continuing developments in Information Technology.” P.WG. Morris. 1994. The Management of Projects. London, UK: Thomas Telford, 217.
P.B. Vaili. 1996. Learning as a Way of Being: Strategies for Survival in a World of Permanent White Water. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 10–14. Leifer et al. classify uncertainty by its sources: market uncertainty (e.g., customer needs may fluctuate);
organizational uncertainty (e.g., shaky commitment of the sponsoring organization);
technological uncertainty (e.g., manufacturing the product involves innovative processes);
and resources uncertainty (e.g., shortage of competent workers). R. Leifer, CM. McDermott, G. Colarelli O’Connor, L.S. Peters, M.P. Rice, and R.W. Veryzer. Radical Innovation: How Mature Companies Can Outsmart Upstarts. 2000. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 22. Chen, Reilly, and Lynn classify uncertainty by dimension (newness vs. change) and by source (market vs. technology).
I. I. Mitroff. 1988. Break Away Thinking. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
P. W. G. Morris. 1994. The Management of Projects. London, UK: Thomas Telford Services, 273.
P.W.G. Morris. 1994. The Management of Projects. London, UK: Thomas Telford Services, 217. Underestimation of uncertainty was reported by Howell and Ballard, who found that in 85 percent of the projects in their sample, managers underestimated the extent of uncertainty. G.A. Howell and G. Ballard. 1995. Lean Production Theory: Moving Beyond “Can-Do.” Unpublished paper, University of New Mexico, Civil Engineering Department. Albuquerque, New Mexico. This phenomenon is true outside project management as well. March states that “there are indications that decision makers, in effect, seek to deny uncertainty … Decision makers tend to exaggerate their control over their environment.” J.G. March. 1994. A Primer on Decision Making. New York, NY: The Free Press, 37. D.N. Michael. 1997. Learning to Plan and Planning to Learn. 2nd ed. Alexandria, VA: Miles River Press, 144.
See G. Stalk. 1988. Time—The Next Resource of Competitive Advantage. Harvard Business Review 66, 4 (July–August): 41–51;
T. Peters. 1990. Drucker, Ohmae, Porter and Peters—Management Briefing. The Economist—Special Report No. 1202 (April): 70;
P.G. Smith and D.G. Reinertsen. 1991. Developing Products in Half the Time. New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold;
C. Meyer. 1993. Fast Cycle Time. New York, NY: The Free Press.
J. D. Blackburn. 1991. Time-Based Competition: The Next Battleground in American Manufacturing. Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin, 201.
W. H. Davidow and M. S. Malone. 1992. The Virtual Corporation. New York, NY: Harper Business, 22.
C. Handy. 2002. The Elephant and the Flea: Reflections of a Reluctant Capitalist. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 101.
Lundin and Söderholm write, “For any organization, time is generally regarded as a scarce resource, as is often alluded to in terms such as ‘time is money.’ For a temporary organization the handling of time is more complicated, since time is literally limited: it ends.” R.A. Lundin and A. Söderholm. 1995. A Theory of the Temporary Organization. Scandinavian Journal of Management 11, 3: 437–55. Kessler and Bierly report that “evidence from 75 new product development projects clearly indicates that speed is positively related to quality and has the greatest influence on success.”
E.H. Kessler and P.E. Bierly III. 2002. Is Faster Really Better? An Empirical Test of the Implications of Innovation Speed. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 49, 1: 2–12.
J.G. March and H.A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York, NY: Wiley;
R.M. Cyert and J. G. March. 1963. Behavioral Theory of the Firm. New York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
H. Mintzberg. 1973. The Nature of Managerial Work. New York, NY: Harper & Row;
R. Steward. 1967. Managers and Their Jobs. Maidenhead, UK: McGraw-Hill. It is illuminating to listen to the lessons that one scholar learned from a short period of real-life experience as a practicing executive. Professor Grayson, dean of the School of Business Administration of Southern Methodist University, served for 16 months as chair of the Price Commission in Phase II of President Richard M. Nixons Economic Stabilization Program. His conclusions concerning management scientists and the issue of managers’ insufficient time were that management scientists do not sufficiently understand the constraint of time on decision making and that their techniques are so time consuming to use that managers pass them by. C.J. Grayson. 1973. Management Science and Business Practice. Harvard Business Review 51, 4 (July–August): 41–8.
T.H. Davenport and J. C. Beck. 2001. The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 4–6.
T.H. Davenport and J.C. Beck. 2001. The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 11.
T. Roszak. 1994. The Cult of Information: A Neo-Luddite Treatise on High Tech, Artificial Intelligence and the True Art of Thinking, 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
J. R. Galbraith. 1977. Organization Design. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley;
P.C. Dinsmore. 1982. The Project Manager’s Time Quandary Surveys Results and Suggested Solutions. Proceedings of the Project Management Institute, Toronto, 1–9.
Mintzberg argues that “somehow, planners want to retain the stability that planning brings to an organization—plannings main contribution, while enabling it to respond quickly to external changes in the environment—plannings main nemesis … What the writers on planning failed to address was the strategists’ fundamental dilemma of having to reconcile the concurrent but conflicting needs for change and stability.” H. Mintzberg. 1994. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Re-conceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners. New York, NY: The Free Press, 184–8.
B. K. Muirhead and W. L. Simon. 1999. High Velocity Leadership: The Mars Pathfinder Approach to Faster, Better, Cheaper. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 23–4.
B. K. Muirhead and W.L. Simon. 1999. High Velocity Leadership: The Mars Pathfinder Approach to Faster, Better, Cheaper. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 86–7.
This approach finds support in the literature. D. L. Parnas and D.M. Weiss. 1985. Active Design Reviews: Principles and Practices. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Software Engineering, 132–6.
Parnas and Weiss recommend that “the characteristics of the reviewers should be explicitly specified before reviewers are selected … The designers should pose questions to the reviewers, rather than vice versa.” J. F. Maranzano, S.A. Rozsypal, G. H. Zimmerman, G.W. Warnken, P.E. Wirth, and D. M. Weiss. 2005. Architecture Reviews: Practice and Experience. Software IEEE 22, 2: 34–43. The authors argue that “a review process isn’t a project’s audit or evaluation against some arbitrary standard, nor it is a tutorial or evaluation of the architects’ performance … The project members don’t expect the review team to solve issues but rather to apply its expertise to uncover issues … A review’s primary customers are the project team members and management.”
R.L. Ackoff. 1970. A Concept of Corporate Planning. New York, NY: Wiley, 129–37. The idea shared by Ackoff about the value of the planning process (vs. the planning product), which was presented in the context of planning in general, found strong support in the agile approach for software projects. Boehm and Turner share an e-mail they received from Kent Beck, cocreator of XP, saying that “I think the phrase ‘plan driven’ [the way Boehm and Turner describe the traditional project management approaches] is the key. I would characterize XP as ‘planning driven’ in contrast.” B. Boehm and R. Turner. 2004. Balancing Agility and Discipline: A Guide for the Perplexed. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 34–5.
A. Laufer and R.L. Tucker. 1988. Competence and Timing Dilemma in Construction Planning. Construction Management and Economics 6, 4: 339–55;
A. Laufer, R. L. Tucker, A. Shapira, and A. J. Shenhar. 1994. The Multiplicity Concept in Construction Planning. Construction Management and Economics 11: 53–65;
J. S. Hekimian and H. Mintzberg. 1968. The Planning Dilemma: There is a Way Out. Management Review. 4–17.
J. C. Emery. 1969. Organizational Planning and Control Systems, Theory and Technology. London, UK: Macmillan;
P.P. Le Breton and D.A. Henning. 1961. Planning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall;
C. W Churchman. 1979. The Systems Approach. New York, NY: Dell Publishing.
A. Laufer and R.L. Tucker. 1988. Competence and Timing Dilemma in Construction Planning. Construction Management and Economics 6, 4: 339–55.
See, for example, B.C. Paulson. 1976. Designing to Reduce Construction Cost. Journal of the Construction Division, ASCE 102: 587–92;
J. Kelly and S. Male. 1993. Value Management in Design and Construction. London, UK: E. & EN. Spon;
J. R. Dixon and M.R. Duffey. 1990. The Neglect of Engineering Design. California Management Review 32, 2: 9–23.
The degree of detail does not depend only on the planning horizon;
it is also adjusted to the project’s degree of uncertainty. The plan should provide a correspondingly higher degree of detail if uncertainty is low—either because the technology is well established by past experience or because the project objectives are not problematic and environmental conditions are stable. When uncertainty is high, the formal plan’s degree of detail for the near term is reduced and its decrease is accelerated across the planning horizon. Also, the greater the uncertainty, the lower the degree of formality in all three kinds of plans.
Steven Pender concludes that “the PMBOK and other reference material is based on probability-based risk management theory. Analysis of the underlying assumptions of the probability-based approach shows it has limited applicability.” S. Pender. 2001. Managing Incomplete Knowledge: Why Risk Management is Not Sufficient. International Journal of Project Management 19, 2: 79–87.
See also S. Lichtenberg. 1974. The Successive Principle-Procedure for a Minimum Degree of Detailing. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Seminar/Symposia of the Project Management Institute. Washington, D.C., 570–8.
The common formats for Action Plans are standard forms, tables, and time charts, as well as drawings and sketches of production methods (when necessary). In construction, for example, the foreman/general foreman may prepare a weekly Action Plan in a simple matrix form. The individual jobs assigned to work crews are entered in the rows of the matrix, while the crew tasks for each day of the week are detailed in each one of the five columns. The following items are typically addressed in the matrix: crew assignments, materials, tools and equipment, production rates, safety hazards, coordination with other crews, and logistics. At the start-up phase of the project, the weekly Action Plan at the foreman/general foreman level is often prepared as a one-page bar chart in which 10 to 50 activities are detailed by half days or even by the hour.
This early preparation allows the project manager to adopt a diverging/converging planning process. In this process, the project manager first starts by diverging, that is, moving outward to gather information and ideas and to generate alternatives. Only then is the project manager ready to converge, that is, to move inward, focus, evaluate, and select.
The Look-Ahead Plan also provides direct guidelines for subsequent Action Plans. Thus, the three-month Look-Ahead Plan is employed by the project superintendent to prepare the monthly Action Plans, while the general foreman prepares the weekly Action Plan on the basis of three-week Look-Ahead Plan. In particular, the preparer of the Action Plan uses the Look-Ahead Plan to learn about the expected results for the coming period, as well as the major means to be utilized in achieving those results. The Look-Ahead Plan also identifies medium- or long-term issues that demand immediate attention, for example, equipment that will be installed only six months from now yet must be ordered immediately. Thus, the current Action Plan will address the equipment-ordering task.
This forecast, however, plays several major roles in a project’s life. It serves as a basis for establishing contracts, both with external parties (contractors and suppliers) and internal parties (other functional units). For these parties, the forecast defines the key assumptions needed for further planning;
for example, on the basis of the forecast, the customer may set or revise the tenant occupancy schedule. It also provides the yardstick with which the overall project performance is evaluated and controlled throughout the projects life.
L. R. Sayles and M. K. Chandler. 1971. Managing Large Systems: Organizations for the Future. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 219;
G. H. A. Morton. 1983. Human Dynamics in Project Planning. In Project Management Handbook, eds. D. I. Cleland and W. R. King. New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold;
D. Mason. 1984. The CPM Technique in Construction: A Critique. AACE Transactions, Montreal, Canada, E.2.1–E.2.10;
A. Laufer and R.L. Tucker. 1987. Is Construction Project Planning Really Doing Its Job? A Critical Examination of Focus, Role and Process. Construction Management and Economics 5, 3: 243–66;
D. Yahdav. 1989. Resource Management: An Imperfect Science. PC Magazine (May 16): 164;
W.M. Dirsmith, S. F. Jablonsky, and A.D. Luzi. 1980. Planning and Control in the U.S. Federal Government: A Critical Analysis of PPB, MBO, and ZBB. Strategic Management Journal 1, 4: 303–29.
In a study that focused on a $20-million model project lasting 18 months, major revisions, which included changes in implementation methods or changes in the sequence of activities, were found to be introduced on an average of every 3.5 months. Under conditions of high uncertainty, frequency of updating was estimated to increase to an average of every 1.5 months. D. Cohenca, A. Laufer, and W. B. Ledbetter. 1989. Factors Affecting Construction Planning Efforts. Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE 115, 1: 70–89;
A. Laufer and R. L. Tucker. 1987. Is Construction Project Planning Really Doing Its Job? A Critical Examination of Focus, Role and Process. Construction Management and Economics 5, 3: 243–66;
A. Laufer and G. Howell. 1993. Construction Planning: Revising the Paradigm. Project Management Journal 24, 3: 23–33;
A. Laufer, R. L. Tucker, A. Shapira, and A. J. Shenhar. 1994. The Multiplicity Concept in Construction Planning. Construction Management and Economics 11: 53–65;
R. Stout Jr. 1980. Management or Control?: The Organizational Challenge. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 24–5.
H. L. S. Younes and R. G. Simmons. 2002. On the Role of Ground Actions in Refinement Planning. In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence Planning and Scheduling Systems, eds. M. Ghallab, J. Hertzberg, and P. Traverso, 54–61. Toulouse, France: AAAI Press.
E. G. Flamholtz. 1996. Effective Management Control: Theory and Practice. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 7. Flamholtz asserts that “many organizations mistakenly believe that planning is complete when a written plan has been developed. Unfortunately, this is merely the end of the beginning, and an effective control system is required if plans are to be fulfilled. Another way to look at it is that planning is actually a component of a control process, and not a stand-alone system, per se.” Flamholtz reaches his conclusion in reference to permanent organizations. Our analysis shows that while in temporary organizations (projects), control and planning are also intertwined, very often the relative roles are reversed. That is, under dynamic conditions, control can be thought of as a component of planning. James A. Highsmith III stresses the importance of learning in the development of software projects. He argues that the assumption underlying traditional project management is that “deviations from the plan are mistakes that must be corrected.” In contrast, the new project management outlook maintains that “deviations guide us toward the correct solution.” J.A. Highsmith III. 2000. Adaptive Software Development. New York, NY: Dorset House Publishing, 42–3. He concludes that “success is determined by the adequacy of the feedback, not by the accuracy of the feed-forward.”
A. Neely and M. Al Najjar. 2006. Management Learning Not Management Control: The True Role of Performance Measurement? California Management Review 48, 3: 101.
G.S. Lynn, M. Mazzuca, J.G. Morone, and A.S. Paulson. 1998. Learning is the Critical Success Factor in Developing Truly New Products. Research Technology Management 41, 3: 45–51.
M.T. Pich, CH. Loch, and A. De Meyer. 2002. On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Complexity in Project Management. Management Science 48, 8: 1008–23.
M.S. Puddicombe. 2006. The Limitations of Planning: The Importance of Learning. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE 132, 9: 949–55. In their research on total quality management (TQM) implementation projects, Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder found that: “the way that these basic TQM precepts have been articulated, extended, and applied has not reflected the distinct, learning-oriented requirements associated with higher levels of uncertainty.”
S.B. Sitkin, K.M. Sutcliffe, and R.G. Schroeder. 1994. Distinguishing Control from Learning in Total Quality Management: A Contingency Perspective. Academy of Management Review 19, 3: 537–64.
A.L. Stinchcombe. 1990. Information and Organizations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2.
See, for example, J.D. Cullen and C.W. Nankervis. 1985. Overcoming the Luddite Factor: Some Behavioral Aspects of the Field Supervisor’s Role in Construction Planning. International Journal of Project Management 3, 3: 133–40.
Galbraith cites studies reporting that higher uncertainty results in a higher frequency of scheduled and unscheduled meetings. R. Galbraith. 1977. Organization Design. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Documenting case studies in the United States and the United Kingdom, J. Nahapiet and H. Nahapiet reached a similar conclusion with specific regard to the planning process in construction projects.
They found planning indeed to be frequently carried out by meetings. J. Nahapiet and H. Nahapiet. 1985. The Management of Construction Projects: Case Studies from the USA and UK. London, UK: Chartered Institute of Building.
D. A. Kolb. 1984. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 30–1. Kolb based his model primarily on the work of J. Dewey, K. Lewin, and J. Piaget (J. Dewey. 1938. Experience and Education, Indianapolis, In: Kappa Delta Phi;
K. Lewin. 1951. Field Theory in Social Sciences. New York, NY: Harper and Row;
J. Piaget. 1971. Psychology and Epistemology. Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books);
D.A. Kolb, R.E. Boyatzis, and C. Mainemelis. 2001. Experiential Learning Theory: Previous Research and New Directions. In Perspectives on Cognitive, Learning, and Thinking Styles, eds. R.J. Sternberg and L.F. Zhang, 227–48. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
D.A. Kolb. 1984. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 41.
The four activities (experiencing, reflecting, thinking, and acting) refer to different time horizons. Practices covered by the other guidelines that are performed on a day-to-day basis, and in particular the Third Gray Guideline, provide additional occasions for collecting feedback and reflecting. Another similar learning model is the one proposed by Daft and Weick, which consists of three components: Scanning (Data Collection regarding performance and the environment), Interpretation (Data Given Meaning), and Learning (Action Taken). R.L. Daft and K. E. Weick. 1984. Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems. Academy of Management Review 9, 2: 284–95.
If the situation surrounding the project has changed and the project has to cope with less frequent changes and as a result has become more stable, then the detailed planning may be done for a longer time horizon. Thus, ongoing incremental control of the evolving plan may assume its classic role, that is, identifying deviations from the plan and adjusting execution to conform to the plan.
R. Simons. 1995. Levers of Control: How Managers Use Innovative Control Systems to Drive Strategic Renewal. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 5. In general, control in organizations has three major meanings: curbing and restraining, directing and commanding, and regulating. F. E. Kast and J.E. Rosenzweig. 1985. Organization and Management: A Systems and Contingency Approach, 4th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 508. In the classic project management paradigm, the typical focus is on regulating. Regulating, in turn, can be carried out only after monitoring and evaluating the actual performance and comparing it with a standard (the plan).
In particular, the Third Gray Guideline (Adopt a Moving About Mode of Communication). One may say that under uncertain conditions, the essence of project planning is uncertainty reduction, while that of control is fast learning from project experience. This new role of project control is just one more example of how causal chains of events in organizations are usually circular rather than linear. That is, the project is started by planning, which is the best way to influence and control the project. “Control” is continued throughout implementation, but its main purpose is really to facilitate continuous planning. For a discussion on circular interdependence and causal loops in organizations, see K.E. Weick. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Random House, 86.
For more on the external role of the project manager, see the research report of B.J. Cullen and O.C. Gadeken. 1990. Competency Model of Program Managers in the DOD Acquisition Process. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College. See also D.G. Ancona and D.F. Caldwell. 1992. Bridging the Boundary: External Activity and Performance in Organizational Teams. Administrative Science Quarterly 37, 4 (December): 634–65.
The first publication on scanning project environment was by the World Bank. See WE. Smith, B.A. Toolen, and F. J. Lethem. 1980. The Design of Organizations for Rural Development Projects— A Progress Report. Staff Working Paper No. 375. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank.
See also R. Youker. 1992. Managing the International Project Environment. International Journal of Project Management 10, 4: 219–26.
For a discussion on planning assumptions, see G. Abonyi. 1982. SIAM: Strategic Impact and Assumptions-Identification Method for Project, Program, and Policy Planning. Technological Forecasting and Social Changes 22, 1: 31–52
J. Glahn and L. Borg. 1988. Decision-Making before “Go”-Supported by Risk Management. Proceedings of the 9th World Congress on Project Management, Glasgow. On the concept of surfacing planning assumptions in reference to strategic planning, see R. O. Mason and I. I. Mitroff. 1981. Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions. New York, NY: Wiley.
P. W. G. Morris. 1994. The Management of Projects. London, UK: Thomas Telford Services, 217.
C. W. Choo. 2001. Environmental Scanning as Information Seeking and Organizational Learning. Information Research 7, 1: an electronic journal. Enacting, which is one of the four scanning modes covered in the paper, is basically an attempt to influence the environment.
The book Predictable Surprises asserts that even when leaders know a problem exists, they often prefer inaction. This is due to the human tendency to maintain the status quo. Employing an explicit procedure like the CAR may sometimes help the organization to attend early on to these future surprises. M.G. Bazerman and M.D. Watkins. 2004. Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press.
Ackoff compared two kinds of mistakes: “Commission (doing what should not have been done) and omission (not doing what should have been done). Errors of omission are generally much more serious than errors of commission, but errors of commission are the only ones picked up by most accounting systems.” In the project world, one may substitute Ackoff s “accounting systems” with “project control systems.” R. Ackoff. 1999. On Passing Through 80. Systemic Practice and Action Research 12, 4: 425–30. M.T. Pich, C. H. Loch, and A. De Meyer classify uncertainty, and they term this kind of omission as “unforeseen uncertainty,” or simply, “unknown unknowns.” M.T Pich, CH. Loch, and A. De Meyer. 2002. Managing Project Uncertainty: From Variation to Chaos. MIT Sloan Management Review (Winter): 60–7.
J. Forester. 1991. Anticipating Implementation: Reflective and Normative Practices in Policy Analysis and Planning. In The Reflective Turn: Case Studies In and On Educational Practice, ed. D.A. Schon, 191–212. New York, NY: Teachers College, Columbia University. Forester, who studied city planners, made a very useful distinction regarding anticipation as follows: “In ordinary language to anticipate and to expect do share meanings but they diverge significantly as well… To anticipate a crisis (or a project, a policy) is not simply to foresee or expect it, but to take steps beforehand to meet it.”
D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky. 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 508.
M. Landau. 1969. Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap. Public Administration Review 29, 4 (July/August): 346–58. The author cites studies that established that if the elements of the system are statistically independent (unrelated), “it requires only arithmetic increases in redundancy to yield geometric increases in reliability” (of the entire system).
Emery argues that since aggregation increases the likelihood that compensating errors will occur, aggregate requirement can be predicted with greater relative accuracy than can the requirement for a smaller subset of the activities. J. C. Emery. 1969. Organizational Planning and Control Systems: Theory and Technology. London, UK: The Macmillan Company, 27.
Great skill and art are required to determine the “right” contingency allowance. If the requested contingency is too low and turns out to be insufficient, you may be regarded as an incompetent project manager. If, however, it is quoted too high in order to be on the safe side, you may hurt the chances of being approved. This global allowance must be treated very carefully;
otherwise, it may be easily consumed without serving its purpose of absorbing uncertainty. See, for example, Y. Asiedu and P. Gu. 1998. Product Life Cycle Cost Analysis: State of the Art Review. International Journal of Production Research 36, 4: 883–908.
The de-scoping practice is a proactive approach to absorbing uncertainty, for both the financing organization and the project itself. In this practice, components of project scope are clearly identified and decoupled from the rest of the scope early on in the project. Thus, if a need to cut cost arises later in the life of the project, these de-scoped components can be actually eliminated from the project scope, easily and quickly, without destabilizing the overall project plan.
M. M. May. 1974. Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press;
M. R. Gardner and W. R. Ashby. 1970. Connectance of Large Dynamic (Cybernetic) Systems: Critical Values for Stability. Nature 228, 5273: 784. Dr. Zeev Bönen, former president, Rafael, Ministry of Defense, Israel, contributed to the development of the “complete network” versus “hierarchy” concept.
Allocating specific time buffers to specific tasks is meaningful and effective only for the short-term Action Plan. For the Master Plan, an overall time reserve should be added to the entire project. As the project proceeds, this global time reserve should be gradually depleted by allocating appropriate time buffers to specific short-term tasks. The Critical Chain approach to project management copes with uncertainty primarily through buffer management. For an assessment of its effectiveness, see, for example, T. G. Lechler, B. Ronen, and E. A. Stohr. 2005. Critical Chain: A New Project Management Paradigm or Old Wine in New Bottles? Engineering Management Journal 17, 4: 45–58;
T. Raz, R. Barnes, and D. Dvir. 2003. A Critical Look at Critical Chain Project Management. Project Management Journal 34, 4: 24–32.
R.T. Pascale. 1991. Managing on the Edge. New York, NY: Touchstone;
K.K Smith. 1984. Rabbits, Lynxes, and Organizational Transitions. In The Challenge of Managing Corporate Transitions, eds. J. Kimberly and J. B. Quinn, 267–94. Homewood, IL: Dow-Jones Irwin.
J. C. Emery. 1969. Organizational Planning and Control Systems: Theory and Technology. London, UK: The Macmillan Company, 26–7.
Galbraith concluded that one of the major benefits of the creation of slack resources is the reduction of the number of exceptions that the manager has to address during task execution. As a result, the amount of information that must be processed during task execution is reduced, which in turn prevents the overloading of the communication channels within the organization. J. R. Galbraith. 1972. Organization Design: An Information Processing View. In Organization Planning Cases and Concepts, eds. J. W. Lorsch and P.R. Lawrence, 49–74. Ontario: R. D. Irwin and Dorsey Press.
M. A. Cusumano and R. W. Selby. 1995. Microsoft Secrets: How the Worlds Most Powerful Software Company Creates Technology, Shapes Markets, and Manages People. New York, NY: The Free Press, 205. Howell, Laufer, and Ballard show that “reducing the immediacy of interactions between sub-cycles is an effective method used by supervisors to cope with the uncertainty. Reducing immediate interaction through the use of buffers … will be the most effective technique for eliminating performance-reducing interactions.” G. Howell, A. Laufer, and G. Ballard. 1993. Interaction between Subcycles: One Key to Improved Methods. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 119, 4: 714–28. Howell and Ballard refined these concepts in their pioneering work on “lean construction.” See, for example, G. Howell and G. Ballard. 1994. Implementing Lean Construction: Reducing Inflow Variation. 2nd Annual Conference on Lean Construction, Católica Universidad de Chile, Santiago, September. For additional research on the use of buffers, see, for example, H. R. Thomas, M. J. Horman, R. E. Minchin, Jr., and D. Chen. 2003. Improving Labor Flow Reliability for Better Productivity as Lean Construction Principle. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 129, 3: 251–61;
S. Lee, F. Pefia-Mora, and M. Park. 2006. Reliability and Stability Buffering Approach: Focusing on the Issues of Errors and Changes in Concurrent Design and Construction Projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE, 132, 5: 452–64.
E. W. Merrow. 1988. Understanding the Outcomes of Megaprojects: A Quantitative Analysis of Very Large Civilian Projects. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
P. W. G. Morris and G. H. Hough. 1987. The Anatomy of Major Projects. New York, NY: Wiley, 12.
N. F. Matta and R. N. Ashkenas. 2003. Why Good Projects Fail Anyways? Harvard Business Review 81, 9: 109–14.
B. Flyvbjerg, N. Bruzelius, and W. Rothengatter. 2003. Megaprojects and Risks: An Anatomy of Ambition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 44.
C.B. Tatum. 1983. Decision-Making in Structuring Construction Project Organizations. Technical Report No. 279. Stanford, CA: Department of Civil Engineering, Stanford University;
R. Youker. 1980. A New Look at Work Breakdown Structure, Course Note Series. Washington, D. C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
M. M. May. 1974. Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press;
M.R. Gardner and W.R. Ashby. 1970. Connectance of Large Dynamic (Cybernetic) Systems: Critical Values for Stability. Nature 228, 5273: 784.
J.R. Galbraith. 1972. Organization Design: An Information Processing View. In Organization Planning Cases and Concepts, eds. J. W Lorsch and P.R. Lawrence, 49–74. Ontario: R. D. Irwin and Dorsey Press;
J. R. Galbraith. 1977. Organization Design. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley;
R.B. Duncan. 1972. Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 3: 313–27;
N.M. Samelson and J.D. Borcherding. 1979. Motivating Foremen on Large Construction Projects. In Construction Productivity, Proceeding of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Reprint 3597, New York, NY, 1–14.
E. F. Schumacher. 1973. Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered. London, UK: Blond & Briggs;
K.E. Weick. 1985. Sources of Order in Underorganized Systems: Themes in Recent Organizational Theory. In Organizational Theory and Inquiry, ed. YS. Lincoln, 106–36. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Weick analyzed permanent organizations and concluded that “stable segments in organizations are quite small.”
J. C. Emery. 1969. Organizational Planning and Control Systems: Theory and Technology. London, UK: The Macmillan Company, 29.
C. B. Tatum. 1983. Decision-Making in Structuring Construction Project Organizations. Technical Report No. 279. Stanford, CA: Department of Civil Engineering, Stanford University.
for sources on risk management, see A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide). 2004. 3rd ed. Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute, 237–54;
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, SP-6105. June 1995. NASA: 37–44.
K. R. MacCrimmon and DA Wehrung. 1986. Taking Risks: The Management of Uncertainty. New York, NY: The Free Press, 21.
D. Michael. 1997. Learning to Plan and Planning to Learn, 2nd ed. Alexandria, VA: Miles River Press, 123.
Brian further explains the quantitative rating system they employed for risk management, which in many ways is similar to the Critical Assumption List we discussed in the Second Green Guideline. B.K. Muirhead and WL. Simon. 1999. High Velocity Leadership: The Mars Pathfinder Approach to Faster, Better, Cheaper. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 37–8.
For overall project results, such as project cost, quantitative analysis is more common because the statistical data base may be wider and the stakes are higher. Moreover, since it is done less frequently and can be performed by a staff specialist (with only limited involvement of line people), allocating time for this analysis should not be a problem.
Schoemaker, who wrote extensively on decision making and planning in uncertain conditions, also discusses our ability to define the risk and asserts that “it is not just the magnitude of uncertainty that creates challenges but also its shifting nature.” A. J. H. Schoemaker. 2002. Profiting from Uncertainty: Strategies for Succeeding No Matter What the Future Brings. New York, NY: The Free Press, 8–10. See also A. Laufer and G. Howell. 1993. Construction Planning: Revising the Paradigm. Project Management Journal24, 3: 23–33. For more on the infrequent use of quantitative risk analysis techniques that are based on probability estimates, see, for example, R. J. Shonberger, who concluded that network simulation is probably not worth the added expense. R. J. Shonberger. 1981. Why Projects Are Always Late: A Rationale Based on Manual Simulation of a PERT/CPM Network. Interfaces 11, 5: 66–76.
B. Flyvbjerg, N. Bruzelius, and W. Rothengatter. 2003. Megaprojects and Risks: An Anatomy of Ambition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 76.
K. R. MacCrimmon and D. A. Wehrung. 1986. Taking Risks: The Management of Uncertainty. New York, NY: The Free Press, 25.
There are additional factors hindering the common use of risk analysis in project management. Shapira argues that in the typical theoretical description for choice among risky alternatives, “the individual making the choice is pictured by this process as a passive agent.” The actual reality, Shapira asserts, is very different: “When taken in a real setting, risky choice is a dynamic-active endeavor that often bears little resemblance to the ordered world of statistical decision theory.” Shapira shows that even regarding the definition of risk itself, there is a striking difference. While “the most common definition of risk in decision theory is the variance of the probability distribution of outcomes,” the managers who participated in his study saw risk differently. Among other things, “they attended more to the magnitude of possible loss than to its probability … they showed very little desire to reduce risk to a single quantifiable construct.” Z. Shapira. 1994. Risk Taking: A Managerial Perspective. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 21, 43.
T. Peters and N. Austin. 1985. A Passion for Excellence: The Leadership Difference. New York, NY: Random House, 116.
B. K. Muirhead and W. L. Simon. 1999. High Velocity Leadership: The Mars Pathfinder Approach to Faster, Better, Cheaper. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 80.
J. West and M. Iansiti. 2003. Experience, Experimentation, and the Accumulation of Knowledge: The Evolution of R&D in the Semiconductor Industry. Research Policy 32, 5: 809–25.
Using the terminology of Staber and Sydow, one may say that the Second Green Guideline enhances “adaptation,” while the Third Green Guideline adds “adaptive capacity.” U. Staber and J. Sydow. 2002. Organizational Adaptive Capacity: A Structuration Perspective. Journal of Management Inquiry 11,4: 408–24.
The concept of stability and flexibility is similar to the concept of “order and freedom” proposed by Schumacher and discussed earlier in this practice. E. F. Schumacher. 1973. Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered. London, UK: Blond & Briggs.
K. E. Weick. 1990. Cartographic Myths in Organizations. In Mapping Strategic Thought, ed. A. S. Huff, 1–10. New York, NY: Wiley.
K. E. Weick. 1985. Sources of Order in Underorganized Systems: Themes in Recent Organizational Theory. In Organizational Theory and inquiry, ed. Y. S. Lincoln, 106–36. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
H. Mintzberg. 1994. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 292–3.
The Price Waterhouse Change Integration Team. 1996. The Paradox Principles: How High-Performance Companies Manage Chaos, Complexity, and Contradiction to Achieve Superior Results. Chicago, IL: Irwin Professional Publishing, 26–7.
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Laufer, A. (2009). The Green Principle: Plan and Control to Embrace Change. In: Breaking the Code of Project Management. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230619517_2
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