Abstract
At the end of the Second World War, the policy of the Allied Forces toward Germany was one of punishment. The defeated nation was made to feel he weight of its guilt, as was established in the instructions of the Allied governments for the occupation authorities. The country was divided into four occupation zones, each one under the military control of one of the four victors of the Second World War (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France). Germany was demilitarized, its productive capacity severely limited, part of its industrial infrastructure dismantled, and the country was ultimately transformed into an international pariah, without self-government and under Allied tutelage.
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Notes
For documents related to the Occupation, see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945–1954 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955); Velma Hastings Cassidy, ed., Germany 1947–1949. The Story in Documents Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). The JCS 1067 is in the latter 21–33. For further reading on the occupation from a U.S. viewpoint, see the biography of the U.S Military Governor Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay. An American Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1990).
Sylvie Lefevre, Les Relations économiques franco-allemandes. De l’occupation a la cooperation (Paris: Comite pour l’Histoire economique et Financiere de la France, 1998), 25
Two excellent works explaining the Marshall Plan period and the rebuilding of Europe according to the U.S. model are Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and David Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (Harlow: Longman, 1992).
On Jean Monnet, see Jean Monnet, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1978); Francois Duchene, Jean Monnet. The first statesman of interdependence (New York: Norton, 1994).
On the Monnet Plan, see Frances M. B. Lynch, France and the International Economy: from Vichy to the Treaty ofRome (London: Routledge, 1997).
Politique Europeenne, Direction Generale des Affaires Politiques, Europe. Direction d’Europe Centrale, 26 January 1953, Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), Paris, Papiers Bidault, 457 AP 44; translation of the author.
On John Foster Dulles see Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy ofthe Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
For the verbatim of the meeting between John Foster Dulles and Pierre Mend’es France, see Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Tuesday, July 13, 1954, 7:30–8:30 pm, Ambassador Dillon’s Residence, Paris.
Pierre Mend’es France, Gouverner, c’est choisir (1954–1955) (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 241–44.
Telegram from François-Poncet to Mend’es France, a/s declarations de M. Von Eckardt, Chef du Service de Presse et d’information du Gouvernement Federal, sur la Conference de Bruxelles, August 30, 1954, MAE, Europe 1944–60, Generalites, vol. 155; Armand Berard, Un Ambassadeur se souvient. Washington et Bonn, 1945–1955 (Paris: Plon, 1978), 566–69.
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© 2008 Carine Germond and Henning Türk
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Munte, V.G. (2008). A New Framework for Franco-German Relations through European Institutions, 1950 to 1954. In: A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616639_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616639_14
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