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The North Korea Nuclear Crisis and U.S.—China Cooperation

Chapter

Abstract

“This whole Six-Party process has done more to bring the United States and China together than any other process I’m aware of,” stated Christopher Hill, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and the top negotiator at the Six-Party Talks, in a media interview after agreement was reached on the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement in Beijing on February 13, 2007.1 This remark, along with countless accolades praising Beijing for its cooperation on the North Korea nuclear issue, is a telling indication of the positive impact that the Six-Party Talks have had on the bilateral relationship between the United States and China.2 Analysts may rightfully note that expressions of appreciation for Chinese cooperation from the United States have been partly intended to press Beijing to do more. Yet, there is little question that successful cooperation on the North Korea nuclear crisis has provided a boost to the U.S.—China bilateral relationship.

Keywords

Korean Peninsula Security Council Nuclear Weapon Bush Administration National Security Council 
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Notes

  1. 1.
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© Suisheng Zhao 2008

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