European Governance and American Sovereignism

  • Zaki Laïdi
Part of the The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy book series (SPIRP)


As discussed earlier, Europe’s social preferences affect the rest of the world in highly variable conditions and proportions. To prohibit importation of beef with hormones from the United States reflects a relationship with food that Europeans can maintain without seeking to impose it on other societies. In the latter can reasonably make do with this. Such preferences shall thus be called defensive social preferences.


Kyoto Protocol Security Council International Criminal Court Global Governance Rome Statute 
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© Zaki Laïdi 2008

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  • Zaki Laïdi

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