Core Executive and Rule Adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic

Abstract

The preceding chapters have shown that variation in core executive institutions shaped Poland’s rule adoption record over time. This chapter examines if the core executive variable is capable of explaining cross-country variation in EU rule adoption. In doing so, it selects two countries that vary on core executive institutionalization— Hungary and the Czech Republic—and checks whether the outcomes of rule adoption in these countries are consistent with the expectations of the core executive model. The chapter first maps the emergence of the Czech and Hungarian “European” cores. It shows that core executive reinforcement advanced furthest in Hungary but failed to make similar progress in the Czech Republic. The chapter then presents comparative data on the success of rule adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The data demonstrate that Hungary performed better at EU rule adoption than the Czech Republic, which confirms the expectations of the core executive model. The chapter closes by assessing the effect of EU conditionality, political party configurations, socioeconomic interests, and executive-legislative relations.