Abstract
This chapter aims at uncovering some of the numerous attempts to conceal the specific nature of affirmative action made by those who were in a position to legitimize it. While they do not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the entire reasoning developed in the two preceding chapters, such attempts do suggest that some of its conclusions have been taken into account.
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Notes
See Herman Belz, Equality Transformed: A Quarter-Century of Affirmative Action, New Brunswick, Transaction, 1991, p. 282.
The Philadelphia Plan was the first official “affirmative action” program. It was set up by the Department of Labor in December 1969 and initially applied only to the construction industry. The program stipulated that the federal government would condition the award of public contracts on the contractors’ “good-faith efforts” toward raising the proportion of underrepresented ethnoracial minorities in their workforce beyond a predefined threshold; see generally Terry H. Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 118–125;
Nicholas Pedriana and Robin Stryker, “Political Culture Wars 1960s Style: Equal Employment Opportunity-Affirmative Action Law and the Philadelphia Plan,” American Journal of Sociology, 103 (3), 1997, pp. 633–691.
On the indeterminacy of what “compliance” to the affirmative action requirement enclosed in Executive Order 11246 and to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act meant, see also Lauren Edelman, “Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,” American Journal of Sociology, 97 (6), 1992, pp. 1536–1538.
Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, pp. 224–225. As summarized by George Schultz, one of the chief designers of the Philadelphia Plan: while “[a] quota is a system which keeps people out …, [w]hat we are seeking are objectives to get people in” (ibid., pp. 196–197); see also Dean Kotlowski, Nixon’s Civil Rights, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 105, 114.
See Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy, New York, The Free Press, 1994.
In addition that what follows, see Roland Fryer and Glenn Loury, “Affirmative Action and Its Mythology,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3), 2005, pp. 148–150.
One of the few areas in which the “goals”/“quotas” distinction has some practical—as opposed to purely symbolic—significance is the army, where affirmative action for women and minorities does not entail preferential treatment. This in turn makes the risk that the beneficiaries of this “nonpreferential” affirmative action should suffer some additional stigma as a result of the policy arguably negligible. Also, since the primary raison d’être of the military is emphatically not to improve the life conditions of American blacks (who now make up about one-third of its personnel), its contribution to the racial integration of American society retains an incidental character, which is arguably an advantage (see Charles Moskos and John Butler, All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way, New York, Basic Books, 1996, pp. 32, 53, 66–71, 119–120). Yet, any attempt to reproduce on a larger scale this “affirmative action model” is arguably bound to fail, for at least two reasons. First, the relatively harmonious nature of race relations in the military is partly a consequence of the exceptionally severe repression of racist and discriminatory behaviors within it, a repression made possible by a general degree of social control that does not exist and would not be considered legitimate in other spheres of contemporary liberal democracies. Second, the very possibility of promoting many blacks to higher positions without having to lower standards in any way depends on a particularly abundant supply of black applicants, which itself is arguably related to their belief that the army is one of the very few institutions that are genuinely open to them (ibid., pp. 9, 42, 69–70).
See Michael Selmi, “Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?” UCLA Law Review, 53 (3), 2006, pp. 757–763, and supra, pp. 121–122.
See Eric Schnapper, “Perpetuation of Past Discrimination,” Harvard Law Review, 96 (4), 1983, p. 832.
Two-thirds of the black working population was employed as domestic servants or farm work-ers when the legislation was enacted. For a convincing argument that this was indeed a case of intentional discrimination, see Robert Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1998.
On the similar use of literacy tests in immigration legislation, see Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 97, 389.
See Douglas Rae, Douglas Yates, Jennifer Hochschild, Joseph Morone, and Carol Fessler, Equalities, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 71.
Of course, the total number of minority applicants must be high enough for race-based test score discrepancies to be statistically significant. This condition is usually met for lower-middle-class jobs (firefighters, police officers, etc.), but not for more high-skilled ones, many of which are only accessible through “subjective” recruitment procedures—such as interviews—that do not always lead to a quantified assessment. This is one of the factors accounting for the “glass ceiling” that thwarts the upward mobility of members of the “protected classes”; see generally Elisabeth Bartholet, “Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places,” Harvard Law Review, 95, 1982, pp. 947–1047.
See Robert Margo, “Educational Achievement in Segregated School Systems: The Effects of ‘Separate-but-Equal,’” American Economic Review, 76 (4), 1986, pp. 794–801.
That increase was not as dramatic as one often assumes, however; see John Donohue and Peter Spiegelman, “The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation,” Stanford Law Review, 43 (5), 1991, p. 998;
Elaine Shoben, “Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What Not?” Brandeis Law Journal, 42 (3), 2004, p. 597.
See Drew Days III, “Fullilove,” Yale Law Journal, 96 (3), 1987, p. 462, fn.30.
On Weber, see also William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 14–31, 37–44, 203–204, 304–305;
Bernard Meltzer, “The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,” University of Chicago Law Review. 47 (3), 1980. pp. 423–466.
In other words, the Griggs decision arguably reflects the Supreme Court’s temptation to bring within the familiar analytical framework of “antidiscrimination law” all the obstacles that black Americans faced, including those whose existence was only dimly perceived at the time of the Civil Rights Act. On this broader tendency to preserve existing cognitive paradigms by making adjustments to allow them to account for new developments that may well—and often do—lead to challenging their overall validity ultimately, see Thomas Kuhn’s seminal analysis in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970 [1962], pp. 52–65. According to Kuhn, the increasing complexity of a paradigm resulting from such numerous adjustments usually paves the way for its demise.
Alfred Blumrosen, Black Employment and the Law, Rutgers, Rutgers University Press, 1971, p. viii (emphasis added).
In this respect, see also Paul Frymer, “Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–1985,” American Political Science Review, 97 (3), 2003, pp. 483–499.
See William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978;
Bart Landry, The New Black Middle Class, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987;
Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999.
See Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, eds., The Black-White Test Score Gap, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1998.
For an explanation of the related, decreas-ing yet still significant gap between the average performance of blacks and whites on IQ tests emphasizing the paralyzing effect of the anxiety of blacks induced by the prospect that lower scores on their part might be interpreted as confirming the validity of some partly internalized racist stereotypes, see Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69 (5), 1995, pp. 797–811. The study found that black scores were markedly lower when the test was openly described as being designed to quantitatively assess the subjects’ intelligence. But see also Roland Fryer and Steven Levitt, “The Black-White Test Score Gap through Third Grade,” Working Paper 11049, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2005, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11049 (accessed on March 24, 2007) and, for a critique of the stereotype threat argument,
Paul R. Sackett, Chaitra M. Hardison, and Michael J. Cullen, “On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for African American-White Differences on Cognitive Tests,” American Psychologist, 59 (1), 2005. on. 7–13.
See Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River, p. 271; Linda Wightman, “The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education”; Maria Cancian, “Race-Based versus Class-Based Affirmative Action in College Admissions,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17 (1), 1998, pp. 94–105;
Deborah Malamud, “Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action,” Journal of Legal Education, 47 (4), 1997, pp. 452–471;
Anthony Carnevale and Stephen Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, Washington, DC, Century Foundation, 2003. In addition, one should keep in mind that those individuals who would not be classified as “dis-advantaged” based on class are currently overrepresented in the group of black applicants whose grades and test scores are high enough for them to eventually gain admission to the most selective universities (while benefiting from some measure of affirmative action); see Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River, p. 50.
See Kahlenberg, The Remedy, p. 170; Richard Fallon, “Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage,” UCLA Law Review, 43 (6), 1996, p. 1927, fn. 47.
In this respect, see also Chapin Cimino, “Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs after Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option or Subterfuge?” University of Chicago Law Review 64 (4) 1997 pp 1289–1310
See Peter Schrag “Muddy Waters” American Pros ect 43, 1999, p 88
See Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars, “When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?” Columbia Law Review, 98 (7), 1998, especially pp. 1611–1614.
Meir Dan-Cohen coined the phrase “acoustic separation” to identify such a disjunction of the expected audiences, leading judges to make allusions that only a fraction of the public is meant to fiilly understand; see Meir Dan-Cohen, “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,” Harvard Law Review, 97 (3), 1984, pp. 625–677,
as well as Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006;
Simone Chambers, “Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (4), 2004, pp. 389–410.
Charles Beitz, “Equal Opportunity in Political Representation,” in Norman Bowie, ed., Equal Opportunity, Boulder, Westview, 1988, p. 162.
See Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi, “‘Expressive Hanns,’ ‘Bizarre Districts,’ and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno,” Michigan Law Review, 92 (3), 1993, pp. 101–205, and, in a broader perspective,
Wibren van der Burg, “The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, Especially with regard to Moral Issues,” Law and Philosophy, 20 (1), 2001, pp. 31–59.
See generally Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, New York, The Free Press, 1990.
As argued by Sunstein in One Case at a Time, pp. 120–122, 130–132. In the same vein, see also Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999;
Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2006.
See Jed Rubenfeld, “Affirmative Action,” Yale Law Journal, 107 (2), 1997, pp. 445–454.
For examples of such critiques, see Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, “Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno,” Michigan Law Review, 92 (3), 1993, pp. 588–651;
Frank R. Parker, “The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno,” District of Columbia Law Review, 3, 1995, pp. 1–59; Kousser, Color Blind Injustice, pp. 366–396.
Ibid. As emphasized by Geoffrey Stone in his contribution to the review symposium “Free Speech and Academic Politics” (Perspectives on Politics, 4 (4), 2006, pp. 740–742), while private institutions may endorse the principle of academic freedom, the First Amendment as a binding source of that principle governs public universities only.
See Regents of the University of Califomia v. Bakke, p. 404 (separate opinion by Justice Blackmun). It is worth pointing out that once this notion of “academic freedom” is invoked in connection with the curriculum (“what may be taught”) with a view to its “diversification,” the meaning of affirmative action changes as far as faculty hiring is concerned. On the one hand, the extension of the diversity argument to this new domain works to facilitate affirmative action, since the advancement of a discipline such as African American Studies leads to job openings that are bound to benefit a majority of black applicants. On the other hand, however, the multiculturalist trend evidenced by the creation of ethnic studies programs and/or departments, insofar as it relies on the correlation between “race” and “perspective” posited in Bakke, incorporates an implicit denial of the very existence of affirmative action: if one takes that correlation for granted, it seems that-everything else being equal-a minority candidate would indeed be more qualified to teach the history and culture of the group to which he himself belongs than a nonminority candidate, given his greater familiarity with the specific “experience” to be considered. The minority applicant’s success in obtaining this kind of position can then be accounted for without “preferential treatment” ever entering the picture; insofar as race itself becomes a “qualification,” the antimeritocratic aspect of affirmative action tends to disappear … For examples of the widespread tendency of university officials to consider ethnic studies programs as an instrument for facilitating the recruitment of blacks and Hispanics within the faculty, see Posner, The Economics of Justice, pp. 384–385; Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams, New York, Holt, 1995, pp. 155–158.
On the historical construction of “merit” as an instmment for the preservation of power by the ruling class, see Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Real Story of Admissions at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 2005.
See Marcia Graham Synnott, The Half-Opened Door: Discnmination and Admissions at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1900–1970, Westport, Greenwood, 1979, p. 107, fn. 29.
See Dan Oren, Joining the Club: A History of fews and Yale, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985, p. 40; Lacome, La Crise de l’identité américaine, p. 319.
See Alan Dershowitz and Laura Hanft, “Affirmative Action and the Harvard College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?” Cardozo Law Review, 1, 1979, pp. 393–394.
See Michael Lind, The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution, New York, The Free Press, 1995, p. 64.
See generally Harry Kitano and Roger Daniels, eds., Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities, Upper Saddle River, Prentice Hall, 2001;
Pyong Gap Min, ed., Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues, Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge Press, 2006;
Frank H. Wu, Yellow: Race in America beyond Black and White, New York, Basic Books, 2002.
See Selena Dong, “Too Many Asians: The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination against Asian Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action,” Stanford Law Review, 47, May 1995, p. 1028;
Andrew Hacker, “Education: Ethnicity and Achievement,” in Nicolaus Mills, ed., Debating Affirmative Action, New York, Delta, 1994. p. 220.
See “Undergraduate and Financial Aid Profile of the Class of 1999,” Alumni Committee Newsletter, Yale University, September 1995, pp. 6–7; Lacome, La Crise de l’identité américaine, p. 323, fn. 1; Jerry Kang, “Negative Action against Asian-Americans,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 31 (1), 1996, p. 14.
See John Bunzel and JefFrey Au, “The Asian Difference,” in Nieli, ed., Racial Preference, pp. 459–463; Grace Tsuang, “Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities,” Yale Law Journal, 98 (3), 1989, pp. 660–661. Disclaimers by university officials notwithstanding, neither the valorization of extracurricular activities (in which white applicants allegedly engage more often) nor a concern for reaching a balance between potential humanities and science majors (under the notion that Asian students disproportionately end up among the latter) can account for this discrepancy; see Bunzel and Au, “The Asian Difference,” pp. 464, 466.
See generally Charles McClain, In Search of Equality; Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
See, for example, Patricia Conley, “The Allocation of College Admission,” in Elster, ed., Local Justice in America, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1995, pp. 59–60. In particular, there are reasons to believe that the advantage enjoyed by blacks and Hispanics in university admissions is usually larger than the one often awarded to athletes and children of alumni; see Richard Kahlenberg, The Remedy, p. 241.
See Rodolfo de la Garza, et al., Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics, Boulder, Westview, 1992, p. 40;
Ronald Talcaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, pp. 421, 432;
Miranda Oshige McGowan, “Diversity of What?” Representations, 57, Summer 1996, p. 133. On the protests triggered by the noninclusion of Asian Americans among the beneficiaries of the affirmative action policy implemented by the Stanford Law School in the 1990s,
see Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige, “Affirmative Action for Whom?” Stanford Law Review, 47 (5), 1995, pp. 855–856. These protests were based on the fact that the internal diversity of the group of Asian applicants had not been taken into account, and that some Asian subgroups defined in terms of national origin remained markedly underrepresented as a result.
United States v. Virginia, electronic edition (reproduced in Donald Kommers and John Finn, American Constitutional Law, vol. 2, Belmont, CA, West/Wadsworth, 1998, pp. 838–839 (emnhasis added)).
See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, Polity, 2001, p. 343, fn.3.
Regents of the University of Califomia v. Bakke, p. 319, fn.53 (emphasis added; the quote is from the decision Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), p. 14). On the issue of whether the Supreme Court should—and does—respond to public opinion, see Jeffiey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006;
Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson, “The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences,” Journal of Politics, 66 (4), 2004, pp. 1018–1035.
See Paul Peterson, “A Politically Correct Solution,” in Paul Peterson, ed., Classifying by Race, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 3–21.
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 235–237;
Owen Fiss, “The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice,” Harvard Law Review, 93, November 1979, pp. 51–52.
On multiculturalism, see generally Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992;
Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007; Sarah Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
In addition to what follows, see Walter Benn Michaels, “From Race into Culture: A Critical Genealogy of Cultural Identity,” Critical Inquiry, 18 (4), Spring—Summer 1992, pp. 655–685; The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality, New York, Metropolitan, 2006,
and the superb essay by Richard Thompson Ford, Racial Culture: A Critique, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005 (especially pp. 44–48).
See generally Michèle Lamont and Marcel Fournier, eds., Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality, Chicago, Univenity of Chicago Press, 1992;
Riva Kastoryano, ed., Les Codes de la différence: race — origine — religion. France — Allemagne — Etats-Unis, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2005.
See Desmond King and Rogers M. Smith, “Racial Orders in American Political Development,” American Political Science Review, 99 (1), 2005, pp. 75–92.
Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, London, Vintage; New Bmnswick, Rutgers University Press, 1989.
See Horace Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples, New York, Boni and Liveright, 1924, especially pp. 122–123, 184–185. This volume brings together a variety of articles written during the 1910s. The most famous one is entitled “Democracy versus the Melting Pot” (1915).
This is also true of the approach of diversity developed by the other major “forefather” of American multiculturalism, Randolph Bourne, whose essay “Transnational America” came out in 1916; see Randolph Boume, “Trans-National America,” Atlantic Monthly, 118, July 1916, pp. 86–97,
as well as John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America, New York, Atheneum, 1975, p. 208; Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now, pp. 101–102, 110, 112.
See Robert Park, Race and Culture, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1950, p. 208.
See Desmond King, Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 30, 35.
See Horace Kallen, Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea: An Essay in Social Philosophy, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956, p. 98.
See Hacker, “Education: Ethnicity and Achievement,” pp. 221–222. That the white graduation rate was about twice as high as the black one was later confirmed by a 1992 National Center for Educational Statistics study; see Kahlenberg, The Remedy, pp. 66–67. Presently the nationwide college graduation rate for black students hovers around 40 percent, compared to 60 percent for white students: see “The Persisting Racial Gap in College Student Graduation Rates,” Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 45, Autumn 2004, pp. 77–85. Similarly, only 57 percent of African Americans who enrol in law schools ultimately graduate and pass the bar, as compared to 83 percent of white students: see Timothy Clydesdale, “A Forked River Runs Through Law School: Towards Understanding Race, Gender, Age and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage,” Law and Social Inquiry, 29 (4), 2004, p. 727.
See Dinesh D’Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, New York, The Free Press, 1991, pp. 50–51, 244–247.
See Ellen Franken Paul, “Careers Open to Talents,” in Steven Cahn, ed., Affirmative Action and the University, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993, p. 257.
See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 231.
For other, similar examples, see Abigail Themstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, “Reflections on The Shape of the River,” UCLA Law Review, 46 (5), 1999, pp. 1589–1592.
As intimated by the former dean of the Yale Law School, Anthony Kronman, it may well be possible to counter this objection by arguing that the distinctive experiences of blacks and Hispanics—leading to the formation of a range of specific beliefs and judgments on their part as to the existing political and institutional order that ought to be taken into account in all instances of public deliberation, including those occurring within universities—are entirely accounted for by the persistence of school and housing segregation. Yet, this—otherwise con-vincing—argument somewhat paradoxically relies on the existence of a sociological fact that is both negative and contingent and therefore ought to be a target for government intervention in its own right, as Kronman willingly acknowledges; see Anthony Kronman, “Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?” Florida Law Review, 52, December 2000, pp. 879–880, 883–885.
See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, “A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,” in Crenshaw et al., ed., Critical Race Theory, pp. 159–176 ; Jonathan Alger, “The Educational Value of Diversity,” Academe, January-February 1997, pp. 20–23;
Charles Lawrence III, “Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation,” Stanford Law Review, 47, May 1995, pp. 819–847.
See Julie Thermes, Essor et déclin de l’affirmative action: Les étudiants noirs à Harvard, Yale et Princeton, Paris, CNRS éditions, 1999, pp. 111–132.
See Thomas J. LA Belle and Christopher R. Ward, Ethnic Studies and Multiculturalism, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 67–89.
See Denis Lacome, “Des Coups de canon dans le vide? La ‘civilisation occidentale’ dans les universités américaines,” Vingtième siècle, 43, 1994, pp. 4–17.
See Arthur Levine and Jeannette Cureton, “The Quiet Revolution: Eleven Facts about Multiculturalism and the Curriculum,” Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 24 (1), 1992, pp. 25–29.
On the extension of the ideology of diversity to the corporate realm starting from the second half of the 1980s, see Erin Kelly and Frank Dobbin, “How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996,” American Behavioral Scientist, 41 (7), 1998, pp. 960–984;
Lauren Edelman, Sally Riggs-Fuller, and Iona Mara-Drita, “Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,” American Journal of Sociology, 106 (6), 2001, pp. 1589–1641.
See Lawrence Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture, Hanover, Wesleyan University Press, 1990, pp. 365–371.
There is now a substantial scholarly literature on the interplay between foreign policy developments and the advent of a more inclusive conception of the U.S. political community: see generally Philip Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999;
Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000;
Daniel Kryder, Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000;
Azza Salama Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941–1960, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000;
Thomas Borstlemann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2001;
John David Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 21–84;
Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land? World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First World War to Vietnam, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006.
See Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2000, chapter 2.
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Sabbagh, D. (2007). Evidence of Dissimulation Strategies. In: Equality and Transparency. The CERI Series in International Relations and Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230607392_7
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