Institutions of Convenience: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Pragmatic Use of International Institutions

Abstract

International relations scholars continue to debate an issue of enduring significance—the role of international institutions in world politics. Within the past 20 years, those working within the liberal theoretical tradition have developed a clear sense of how and why international institutions matter. Robert Keohane, writing in After Hegemony and elsewhere, argues that international institutions and regimes should be viewed in terms of their functional attributes.¹ Regimes facilitate cooperation by providing frameworks for interaction and communication among states in an uncertain environment.² They enhance transparency by conveying information about the intentions of actors, and they help states to reduce the transaction costs associated with bargaining to reach international agreements. Keohane goes as far as to suggest that international institutions might substitute for a dominant power as a means to maintain international order. A dominant power, or hegemon, may be required to create viable international institutions, but as hegemony fades, international institutions can take on a life of their own and become functional substitutes for the power of dominant states.