Abstract
For many years, Japan’s technological capabilities have provided it with a relatively unique status among industrial nations. This chapter selectively examines the role that technology has played in Japan’s actual and potential security posture. In doing this, it looks at some past and current uses and considerations of technology, including how it relates to nuclear weapons, missile defense, and Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The chapter concludes by suggesting three important ways that Japan can advance the use of technology to promote nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.
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Notes
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Fumikazu Asa, “Invisible Testing,” in The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons ( Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999 ), pp. 45–49.
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© 2006 Anthony DiFilippo
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Difilippo, A. (2006). Technology, Choice, and Nuclear Weapons. In: Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230600720_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230600720_3
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