Abstract
European Union constitutional negotiations are complex and often quite messy and chaotic affairs.1 The final deal is by no means a given when governments sit down at the negotiating table to discuss sensitive constitutional reforms on an often large range of complex topics. A mutually acceptable compromise does not materialize by itself; it is the result of a long and often complicated negotiating process. This volume asserts that leadership is a crucial factor in overcoming the strong collective action problems and high bargaining costs that exist within these history-making constitutional negotiations. Leadership is defined relatively broadly as any action undertaken by an actor in order to attempt to solve collective action problems through the use of leadership resources. The provision of leadership is often motivated by an interest in collective gains. Often it is also directed at influencing outcomes for private gain.
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© 2006 Derek Beach and Colette Mazzucelli
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Beach, D., Mazzucelli, C. (2006). Conclusions. In: Beach, D., Mazzucelli, C. (eds) Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230599642_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230599642_13
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-54680-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59964-2
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