Abstract
The decision to withdraw from Britain’s major military bases East of Suez in the late 1960s was a landmark in Britain’s twentieth-century history. As has been shown, the process of reaching this decision was a complex one. It is impossible to identify one single cause at the cost of other important variables, rather like the case of the impressionist paintings of Claude Monet. His incremental additions of colours appear at first to be incomprehensible, but when seen at a distance they suddenly make sense: his famous water lilies elegantly floating in a pond in the morning light, in the daylight and in the twilight, are there for all to see. If one is allowed to compare his impressionist approach with Britain’s decision on ‘East of Suez’, it was for Britain a matter of water lilies. Over a number of years, the East of Suez role occupied much of the British governing elites’ time and energies. Their deliberations over this subject were closely related to Britain’s other problem: that is, how to maintain its power and influence in the post-war world.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
L. Martin, British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional (Adelphi Papers, No. 61) (London: IISS, 1969 ), p. 4.
D. Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p.273; Crossman, 26 Jan. 1968, 14/16, AHP; Bruce to Rusk, 23 Jan. 1968, Bruce diaries.
C. Mayhew, Britain’s Role Tomorrow ( London: Hutchinson, 1967 ), pp. 25–6.
M. Dockrill, Britain’s Defence Since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp.104, 151–2.
M. Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945 ( London: Hutchinson, 1992 ), p. 105.
S. Dockrill, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.9–10; the subject is discussed in more detail in Paul Cornish, British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany, 1945–1950 ( Basingstoke: Macmillan — now Palgrave, 1996 ), pp. 152–8.
B. Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964–70 (London: Weidefeld & Nicolson, 1984), p.107; Wilson Johnson meeting at the White House, 2 June 1967, FCO 46/28.
E. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World war II (London: Bodley Head, 1987) p.305; author’s interview with Lord Healey; M. Dockrill, Britain’s Defence, pp.99–100; D.C. Watt, ‘Britain and the Indian Ocean: Diplomacy before Defence’ Political Quarterly, 42:3 (July—Sept 1971 ), pp. 307–8.
S. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles ( London: Collins, 1988 ), p. 381.
Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000 (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p.47; Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.306; Carver, Tightrope Walking, p.95; IISS, Strategic Survey, 1971 ( London: IISS, 1972 ), pp. 39–40.
Copyright information
© 2002 Saki Dockrill
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dockrill, S. (2002). Conclusion. In: Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez. Cold War History Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597785_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597785_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40703-3
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59778-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)