Science and Recognition
One may think of human societies as consisting, amongst other things, of various kinds of institutions through which equally varying kinds of human goods are produced. The question then arises of how these institutions manage to do this — by means of what devices and mechanisms, relying on what sorts of motivations and social relationships — and with what degrees of success. There is no reason to assume that the answers to these questions of ‘institutional design’ will be the same in every case: it might well be that different kinds of institutions are more or less successful for different kinds of goods.
KeywordsAcademic Science Collective Goal Human Good Internal Good Favourable Opinion
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- 11.There is, of course, a great deal more to Hagstrom’s and Ravetz’s analyses than I shall consider here. In particular, anyone wishing to find a fully elaborated example of what MacIntyre would regard as an institutionally organized practice could do no better than turn to Ravetz’s Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, ‘despite’ its having been written much earlier than After Virtue. Conversely, Hagstrom and Ravetz are not the only sociologists of science who have seen recognition as an important element in scientific institutions: see also, for example, Jerry Gaston’s The Reward System in British and American Science (1978). For informative reviews of research and debates on the organisation of modern scientific communities, see Mulkay (1977) and Zuckerman (1988).Google Scholar