The Pursuit from El Alamein to Tunisia

Abstract

After the defeat of Axis forces at El Alamein, British commanders had to decide whether to pursue and encircle the remains of the Afrika Korps quickly, or gather British strength for the long pursuit to Tunisia. Montgomery initially planned for the former, but poor execution caused him to slow his advance and operate in a hesitant but determined manner, despite abundant intelligence on the appalling state of the Afrika Korps.¹ Of the roughly 100,000 Axis forces at the start of El Alamein, a total of 35, 700 were killed, wounded, or captured, and Ultra revealed that on 10 November 21^st Panzer and 90^th Light Divisions had roughly 1,000 men apiece, and 15^th Panzer Division only 1,200.² Moreover, of 366 German and 318 Italian tanks that began the battle, Ultra showed that 15^th Panzer Division had no serviceable tanks, 21^st Panzer Division had only eleven, and the entire army only enough petrol to move 150 kilometres.³ Other sources of intelligence, such as photographic reconnaissance and prisoner of war interrogation, reinforced such intelligence, yet neither Montgomery nor Coningham exploited the situation. The failure to cut off rapidly the remnants of the Afrika Korps stemmed from memories of the all too recent reversals suffered by the Eighth Army in the desert, but also was the first of several failures to act with speed in response to the good intelligence on their absolute strength during the advance to Tunisia.