Air Support from ‘Compass’ to ‘Crusader’

Abstract

The RAF’s early attempts to provide air support suffered from a lack of a fully developed air support doctrine, and insufficient practical experience in conducting such operations. Initial efforts were weak and inefficient, but against a largely unmotorized and qualitatively inferior Italian army in the desert, they were surprisingly successful, and out of proportion to the effort involved. The constant bombing, both day and night, even of a small number of British aircraft, had a telling effect on the morale of the Italian army, and hastened its collapse. This success was cut short by the entry of the German Afrika Korps into the theatre, which forced Britain to fight a rapid mobile war for which it was unsuited. Its entire approach to air support had to be re-thought, including the introduction of more efficient and rapid procedures for dealing with incoming intelligence so to enable it to direct attacking aircraft. However, these changes mattered little until the British army learned to fight effectively, and to integrate air support into its battle plans. Developing such a system was time consuming, costly, and had to be accomplished at a time of great stress.