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Consequences, January–June 1950

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Part of the Global Conflict and Security since 1945 book series (GCON)

Abstract

The French transfer of administrative powers to the Bao Dai Government on 30 December 1949 did little to reduce the growing international concern or the internal crisis in Indo-China. French failure to ratify the 8 March Agreement made the transfer of administrative powers an empty gesture. It provided Ho with the opportunity to counter ratification and any subsequent international recognition. Continued DRVN control of large areas of Vietnam justified Nehru’s assertion that in reality there were ‘two governments in Indo-China’.1 On 18 January the DRVN was formally recognised by the PRC.2 As French complacency continued, so did Ho’s diplomatic offensive. In late January he held further talks with the PRC before proceeding to Moscow for negotiations with Stalin who rejected DRVN requests for direct Soviet aid, regarding this as the PRC’s task. Russia formally recognised the DRVN on 30 January.3 Ho appeared to have achieved if not a diplomatic advantage over the French and Bao Dai then at least equilibrium. The Indo-Chinese Communist Party declared Indo-China one battlefield and the Vietminh were prepared to provide leadership for the Cambodian and Laotian revolutionary movements.4 Cambodia was an important source of finance for the Vietminh, through the control and taxation of fishing, pepper and rice production.5 Coincidentally, Jessup, the US Ambassador at large, visited Hanoi and Saigon at the end of January as part of his tour to assess the growing crisis in the Far East.6

Keywords

Associate State High Commissioner Administrative Power Military Equipment Commonwealth Government 
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Notes

  1. 4.
    M. Furuta, ‘The Indochina Communist Party’s Division into Three Parties: Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Cambodia and Laos, 1948–1951’, T. Shiraishi and M. Furuta (eds), Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s, New York, 1992, pp. 151–2.Google Scholar
  2. 58.
    Halifax to Bevin, 6 April 1946, Enclosure, R.D. Crockatt (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Series C, North America, Part 4: Volume 1: January–December 1946, University Publications of America, 1999, pp. 97–9; Rotter, op. cit., pp. 178, 189.Google Scholar
  3. 65.
    Harvey to Bevin, no.129, Paris, 22 February 1950, R.D. Crockatt (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Series C, North America, Part 4: Volume 4: January 1950–December 1950, University Publications of America, 2003, pp. 40–4.Google Scholar
  4. 66.
    PREM 8/1202, Minutes of an Informal Meeting of Ministers, 15 May 1950, R. Bullen, and M. Pelly (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas Series 2: Volume 2: The London Conferences: Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Strategy January–June 1950, London, 1987, pp. 352–4.Google Scholar
  5. 174.
    Minutes of a Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 28 June 1950, H.J. Yasamee, and K.A. Hamilton (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas Series 2: Volume 4: Korea June 1950–April 1951, London, 1991, pp. 7–10.Google Scholar

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© T.O. Smith 2007

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