Abstract
Russian enterprises have experienced drastic changes since the financial crisis of 1998. Big businesses, including oligarchic groups, are the most dominant and influential forms. They include independent companies, corporate forms that integrate production and sales companies (specialized integrated business groups) and integrated business groups (the entire business belonging to specific industrial/non-industrial branches). These large groups emerged in the late 1990s when ownership and control were taken on by core companies (the holding companies) while government preserved its influence. With the economic recovery following the financial crisis, changes in ownership and control have occurred. While the integrated business groups continue to exist, their form has changed and the main industrial (energy) companies now occupy the core of the economy and power in it.1
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Endnotes
The term ‘harmonization’ or ‘harmonizing’ is often used as a measure of the EU integration, which implies mutual approval of institutions and ‘an effort to avoid the standard model than to further it’ (H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The end of history for corporate law’, J. N. Gordon and M. J. Roe, eds, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, Cambridge, 2004, p. 62).
See S. D. Mogilevskii, Legal Bases of Joint Sto ck Companies’ Activity, Moscow (in Russian), 2004
O. A. Makarova, Legal Reference-Book for Entrepreneurs, St. Petersburg (in Russian), 2003
T. G. Dolgopyatova, Russian Industry, Moscow (in Russian), 2002, pp. 53–6. Limited companies can be established as major Russian incorporated companies by individuals, juridical persons or state organizations. The Law on Limited Company took effect on 1 March 1998. In many cases, limited companies frequently establish small to medium companies and subsidiaries, and their functions closely resemble those of closed JSCs. Limited companies do not have restrictions such as those in the case of JSCs (compulsory reserve funds, etc.), and they do not receive special tax benefits. The minimum capital of limited companies is 100 times that of the official minimum monthly wage, and if net assets become less than the minimum capital it is liquidated.
See A. A. Semenov, People’s Enterprise, Moscow (in Russian), ‘People’s enterprises were used to maintain inter-business ties and prevent takeovers’; S. B. Avdasheva, Economic Connections in the Russian Industry, Moscow (in Russian), 2000, p. 103.
For the control mechanism see S. D. Mogilevskii, op. cit.; S. E. Zhilinskii, Entrepreneurs’ Rights, Moscow (in Russian), 2002
I.V. Doinikov, Entrepreneurs’ Rights, Moscow (in Russian), 2002
M. G. Iontsev, Joint Stock Companies, Moscow (in Russian), 2002
L. S. Blyakhman, Economics of Firm, SPb. (in Russian), 1999
A. P. Slivko, L. I. Kotieva and I. L. Borova, Regulations of Joint Stock Company, Moscow (in Russian), 2002
I. Iwasaki, ‘The governance mechanism of Russian firms’, Post-Communist Economies, 15(4), 2003, pp. 503–531, p. 136.
The shareholders’ general meeting is held annually. Since the fiscal year ends on 31 December, the meeting is held between the beginning of March and the end of June (most are held in April and May due to the tax payment period). In addition, a special shareholders’ meeting is held upon request by the board of directors/supervisory board and shareholders who own more than 10 per cent of shares. In reality, the general meeting cannot be held without approval from the board of directors (G. Kleiner, Nezavisimaya, 8 May 2001).
With respect to employees, while negotiations through social partnership were acknowledged, real influence on management was limited (OECD, White Paper on Corporate Governance in Russia, 15 March 2002, p. 18). The general meeting of the labour group exists only in name; it is not prescribed in corporate laws. It may appear in the form of strikes in a protest situation; however, in reality, there exist only a few cases.
See the World Bank, ‘Ownership and control of enterprises’, Voprosui ekonomiki, 8 (in Russian), 2004, 10–13.
A. V. Buzgalin and A. I. Kolganov, Theory of Socio-economic Transformation, Moscow (in Russian), 2003.
G. Kleiner, Nezavisimaya, 8 May 2001.
R. Kapelyushnikov, ‘Policy of wages in Russian enterprises’, L. M. Grigoriev et al., eds, 1000 Best Enterprises in Russia, Moscow (in Russian), 2003
‘Russian model of labour market’, E. Mokhova, ed., What Kind of Labour Market is necessary in the Russian Economy? Moscow (in Russian), 2003.
A. Radygin and S. Arkhipov, ‘Ownership, corporate conflicts and efficiency’, Voprosui ekonomiki, 11 (in Russian), 2000, 121.
See A. Yakovlev, ‘Competitive environment and corporate governance’, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, The Russian Economic Barometer, XIII, 3, 2004, pp. 19–24, p. 137.
R. Kapelyushnikov and N. Demina, ‘Concentrated ownership and management turnover: The case of Russia, Institute of World Economy and International Relations’, The Russian Economic Barometer, XIV, 1, 2005, 14.
S. M. Puffer and D. J. McCarthy, ‘The emergence of corporate governance in Russia’, D. J. McCarthy, S. M. Puffer, S. V. Shekshnia, Corporate Governance in Russia, Edward Elgar, 2004, p. 23. The Russian governance is similar to the Japanese, as far as the board of internal auditors is organized.
See The Russian Institute of Directors, Annual Research on Practice of Corporate Governance in Russia, 2005 (in Russian).
See G. Kleiner, R. Kachalov and E. Sushko, ‘Economic State and institutional environment of Russian industrial enterprises’, Voprosui ekonomiki, 9 (in Russian), 2005, 77–9.
See M. V. Kurbatova and S. N. Levin, ‘Social responsibility of Russian business’, EKO, 4 (in Russian), 2005, 68–9.
The Russian banking sector displays features that are similar to those in other petrostates, i.e., informal pocket banks with unidentified shareholders and state giants like Sberbank (A. Gnezditskaia, ‘“Unidentified shareholders”: the impact of oil companies on the banking sector in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 57(1), 2005, 476).
See S. A. Afontsev, ‘Economic agreements and regional cooperation’, paper for Symposium on the Russian Economy by Cabinet Office, Japan, 30 March 2005.
‘For the EU accession countries, the European Union looks like an anchor, peer, and savior, providing their dominant export market, as well as a source of institutions and financing…. Russia continues to play a key role for other CIS countries as their main export market and as a peer.’ (A. Åslund, Building Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 454–5).
V. Mau, ‘Economic policy in 2004’, Voprosui ekonomiki, 1 (in Russian), 2005, 8.
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© 2008 Satoshi Mizobata
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Mizobata, S. (2008). Diverging and Harmonizing Corporate Governance in Russia. In: Pickles, J. (eds) State and Society in Post-Socialist Economies. Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230590922_6
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