Abstract
A key feature of communism was the organization of society into formal and informal spheres. Formally, communist society was defined by a vast number of laws and rules and regulations, and the economy was regulated by short-term and long-term plans. As laws were frequently idealistic — and consequently also often unrealistic1 — and plans (carrying the status of law) were often too taut to be implemented, informality became a useful tool to circumvent the former and secure fulfilment of the latter. It was also used by the general public as a strategy for coping with everyday life: having a contact in the right place gave access to consumer goods that were in short supply and otherwise impossible to obtain. Finally, informality was used to gain privileges such as the right to study at a good university or to secure easy military service, a good position or nice housing.2
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Endnotes
M. Goldman, The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972.
Å. B. Grødeland, T. Y. Koshechkina and W. L. Miller, ‘“Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take”, in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts’, Europe-Asia Studies 50(4), June 1998, 649–75.
For examples of corrupt politicians in East Central and Southeast Europe, see M. Brusis, I. Kempe and W. van Meurs, ‘Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Political Corruption’, in R. Hodess, T. Inowlocki and T. Wolfe (eds), Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2003, London: Profile Books, 2003, pp. 181–82
Open Society Institute, EU Accession Monitoring Program, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002, pp. 106–8 and pp. 451–516.
W. L. Miller, Å. B. Grødeland and T. Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Postcommunist Government in Europe, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001.
See for instance F. Saliger, ‘Korruption und Betrug durch Parteispenden’, in Neue juristische Wochenschrift, 58(16), 2005, pp.1073–78
H. von Arnim (ed.), Korruption — Netzwerke in Politik, Aemtern und Wirtschaft, München: Knaur, 2003.
See for instance M. J. Garmaise and T. J. Moskowitz, ‘Informal Financial Networks: Theory and Evidence’, in The Review of Financial Studies, 16(4), Winter 2003, 1007–40. Garmaise and Moskowitz used a dataset detailing brokerage activity in the US commercial real estate market for their study.
Whereas in-depth interviews are frequently used to study informal networks, surveys are less commonly used. While some more recent studies have made use of internet surveys to collect data, it is still a widely held view amongst people studying networks that surveys are better avoided. For an account of the former, see R. Cross, N. Nohria and A. Parker, ‘Six Myths about Informal Networks — and how to overcome them’, in MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring 2002, 67–75. D. J. Watts argues that surveys are not a very reliable way to obtain high-quality data on networks ‘not only because people have a hard time remembering who they know without being suitably prodded, but also because two acquaintances may have quite different views of their relationship. So it can be hard to tell what is actually going on. The method also requires a lot of effort on behalf of the subjects and particularly the investigator.
A much better approach is to record what it is that people actually do, who they interact with, and how they interact’ (D. J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003, p. 26). As we are not interested in how people in networks are linked with each other, but more with their impact in the political sphere, in the judiciary and in public procurement, however, the flaws Watts refers to are not relevant to our study.
For a fuller version of this chapter, see Å. B. Grødeland, ‘“Red Mobs”, “Yuppies” and “Lamb Heads”: Informal Networks and Politics in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania’, Europe Asia Studies 59(2), March 2007, 217–52.
B. A. Cellarius, In the Land of Orpheus: Rural Livelihoods and Nature Conservation in Postsocialist Bulgaria, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2008 Åse B. Grødeland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Grødeland, Å.B. (2008). Informal Practice, Cultural Capital and Politics in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. In: Pickles, J. (eds) State and Society in Post-Socialist Economies. Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230590922_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230590922_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35681-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59092-2
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)