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The Economic Analysis of US Antitrust Merger Law

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Mergers and Acquisitions

Part of the book series: Finance and Capital Markets Series ((FCMS))

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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to survey the basic economic literature concern-ing the antitrust analysis of mergers in the USA. That is a relatively difficult task, since the USA has a long history of antitrust merger law, and it is also the country where the economic analysis of mergers began.

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Authors
  1. Germán Coloma
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business and Economics, State University of New York (Plattsburgh), USA

    Greg N. Gregoriou (Professor of Finance) (Professor of Finance)

  2. State University of New York (Plattsburgh), USA

    Karyn L. Neuhauser (Assistant Professor) (Assistant Professor)

Copyright information

© 2007 Germán Coloma

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Cite this chapter

Coloma, G. (2007). The Economic Analysis of US Antitrust Merger Law. In: Gregoriou, G.N., Neuhauser, K.L. (eds) Mergers and Acquisitions. Finance and Capital Markets Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230589681_10

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