The Problem of the Basing Relation

Abstract

A complete theory of how experience can justify a belief is both an account of under what conditions the belief is justifiable (rational) and whether it is justified. A justifiable belief is one where an agent is said to have adequate grounds or evidence for the belief in question while a justified belief is one where the agent’s belief is based on those adequate grounds. What distinguishes the two cases concerns the obtaining of an epistemic relation, the basing relation whose nature and character are the main concerns of this chapter. To set the stage for discussion, I begin by evaluating two major trends in the basing relation debate, namely, the causal and doxastic theories. My emphasis though will be on causal theories as it is widely believed that some version of the causal theory must be true. There is however disagreement as to how one should account for a major problem with such theories, that is the problem of deviant causal chains. I shall discuss and criticize one recent prominent solution to this problem before proposing my own (Davidsonian) gloss on causal theories. Let us then begin by a brief survey of the current approaches to the question of the basing relation.