Wittgenstein on Emotion

Abstract

In this chapter I try to argue that in Wittgenstein’s writings between 1946 and 1949 and, in particular, in the context of his remarks on emotions a tension can be seen between his emphasis on the unity of the concept of an emotion and a conflicting emphasis on differences between our concepts of individual emotions. This tension is at the same time one between earlier and later remarks.¹ Accordingly, in the first section I shall give a brief account of the earlier thought on emotion (1946–1948) as epitomized in Wittgenstein’s second attempt at delineating a general classification of psychological concepts (RPP II, § 148²), while in the second section I try to sketch Wittgenstein’s modified approach (1948–1949) as indicated by a number of subsequent remarks. I do not want to suggest that the modified approach can be fully and clearly stated, but I do think that it is informed by a peculiar metaphor which suggests that Wittgenstein was moving in a direction which he had not seen in earlier writings.