Conflict Resolution: Power-Sharing and Other Inclusion Strategies

Abstract

This chapter considers contemporary theories and practice regarding the use of power-sharing and other inclusion incentives in peace agreements, and begins to identify gaps in the increasingly voluminous literature on peace implementation, though a detailed examination of all facets of peace negotiations and peacebuilding is beyond the scope of this volume.¹ The chapter then turns to the claim that power-sharing and inclusion strategies help convince armed groups to participate in peace negotiations, particularly when coupled with security guarantees from key external actors, and considers a key critique of the liberal peacebuilding consensus as an excessively Western, external imposition that does not function effectively in most postconflict situations. I suggest, in particular, that the focus of this liberal consensus on certain strategies of inclusion and governance is too narrow, and may fail to provide the correct leverage or incentives for armed groups. Further, I argue that this focus may be counterproductive, channeling existing conflicts and mistrust into institutions of governance.