Abstract
French NGDOs have, over the global era, clearly moved some way into line with the wider trends outlined in our introductory chapter. But they have also been careful to ensure that their relationship with the French authorities should not become ‘too close for comfort’ (Hulme and Edwards, 1997), that their modus operandi should not be overly bureaucratic and that they should not find themselves labelled as mere agents or vectors of the government. By imposing limits on their collaboration with the state, French NGDOs might appear to be undermining our working assumption, which contended that NGOs that adhere to RD theory, should normally be proactive and flexible in their pursuit of central government resources. Yet, have French NGDO been acting out of line with the logic of RD and missing out on valuable funding opportunities from their central state? Or, have they been correctly interpreting their resource context, but operating in a climate which simply does not promote closer NGDO-government cooperation? These questions will be central to this chapter, which will begin by examining the evidence that French development NGOs have misread their resource opportunities, before constructing our main argument, namely that they have been ‘enacting’ (i.e., correctly interpreting) the resources available from the state and other actors in their environment.1
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Notes
Between 1996 and 2002, only about ten French NGOs benefited from the early schemes (the conventions programmes) funded under the new contractual arrangements; see F. Fiard, communiqué in Aventure, no. 96, autumn 2002, www.la-guilde.org.
Seventeen of the 23 French regions included overseas development activities in their work schedule for 2000–06; see CRID, Les Cahiers de la Solidarité, February 2004. Three thousand territorial authorities are thought to be active in 115 countries with an estimated budget of M€200 (OECD, 2004: 34).
See L. F. Salmen an A. P. Eaves, ‘Interactions between NGOs, Governments and the World Bank’, in Paul and Israel (1991: 94–133).
For details of the subsequent bankruptcy of this organisation in 1998, see M. Deprost, ÉquiLibre, une Faillite Humanitaire, Éditions Golias, Paris, 2003.
Comment by E. Barrau, ‘ONG: Entre exigence …’, Aventure, no. 93, autumn 2001. Such employees are thought by some NGDOs to be engaging in ‘humanitarian tourism’.
See C. Jacquiau, Les Coulisses du Commerce Équitable, Mille et Une Nuits, Paris, 2006.
See Chrisian Troube, Les Forcénés de l’Humanitaire: Les Leçons de l’Arche de Zoé, Autrement, Paris, 2008.
In 1999, only 42.5 per cent of French people expressed confidence in NGOs; see CCFD, Baromètre de la Solidarité Internationale des Français, CCFD, Paris, 10th survey, 1999.
The Guilde Européenne du Raid has engaged in a policy of portage towards associations such as Enfants du Mékong and Enfance Espoir; see S. Gouraud, ‘Un parcours de citoyenneté’, Aventure, no. 98, autumn 2003, www.la-guilde.org/article.php3?id_article=286.
See I. Sommier, Les Nouveaux Mouvements Contestaires, Flammarion, Paris, 2003, pp. 176–89.
See F. Verschave, Noir Chirac, Arènes, Paris, 2002;
F. Verschave, Complicité de génocide? La Politique de la France au Rwanda, La Découverte, Paris, 2004;
and Agir Ici and Survie, France-Zaire-Congo 1960–1997, Harmattan, Paris, 1997.
See respectively, S. Brunei, Le Gaspillage de l’Aide Publique, Seuil, Paris, 1994; Lancaster (1999); and (OECD, 2004).
Cited in T. Allen, ‘The Future of International NGO Programme’, Summary Paper lor BOND, June 2004, www.bond.org.uk/pubs/lutures/launch_writeup.pdf.
For the report of the first of these Assises or periodic gatherings of local authorities, mayors and civil society actors interested in international development, see French Foreign Ministry, L’Action Internationale des Collectivités Locales, Foreign Ministry, Paris, 2003.
See, for example, UNESCO, Directives concernant les Relations de l’UNESCO avec les Organisations Non-Gouvernementales, UNESCO, New York, 1995.
NGOs ‘compete to keep down their declared overheads, as though spending on management were synonymous with inefficiency. Low overheads are thus still a criterion against which public opinion measures an NGO’s effectiveness’; see T. Wallace, ‘New Development Agendas: Changes in UK NGO Policies and Procedures’, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 24, no. 71, 1997, pp. 35–55.
See, for instance, G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, Hurst, London, 1995.
The June 2000 Cotonou Agreement requires that European development aid should seek to strengthen civil society in developing countries. The EU also introduced, in 2002, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, which has helped to reorient European efforts away from electoral assistance and towards a more participatory approach. See Richard Youngs, ‘European Approaches to Democracy Assistance’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, 1, 2003, pp. 127–38.
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© 2009 Gordon D. Cumming
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Cumming, G.D. (2009). A Resource Dependence Perspective. In: French NGOs in the Global Era. French Politics, Society and Culture Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230581968_8
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