Preparing to Feed Mars: Anglo-French Economic Co-ordination and the Coming of War, 1937–40

Abstract

The experience of 1914–18 demonstrated incontrovertibly that the success or failure of a nation — or alliance — in modern war depended as much on economic organization as it did on courage at the front or talented generalship. Above all, episodes in the first world war such as the ‘shells scandal’ in Britain in the spring of 1915, as well as the need to enhance the efficiency of French war industries discovered and subsequently undertaken by Etienne Clémentel and Louis Loucheur in 1917, exposed the vital importance of a professional preparation and management of defence industries.¹ Victory in the ‘age of industrialized war’ demanded a ruthless and integrated regime to ensure timely and almost unlimited supply to the armed forces of weapons, equipment and munitions. Such a regime had to do this without bankrupting the nation. Yet, whilst meeting military needs, it had to avoid neglecting civilian requirements for food and fuel to the point of provoking serious pressure to end the war before victory was achieved. Britain and France both sought to learn and embed these ‘lessons’ of 1914–18. Both powers established bodies responsible, in peacetime, for planning and administering a rapid expansion and balanced distribution of productive resources in the event of another war. This chapter will, first, briefly review the British and French administrative arrangements.